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MULTILATERAL INDEXED LOANS  
AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
Alessandro Missale and Emanuele Bacchiocchi*
Abstract
We study the potential for introducing indexation on loans provided by multilateral lenders to low 
income countries (LICs), and thus whether a reform of their lending policy is feasible and economically 
justified. To this end, we provide new evidence for a group of 40 international development association 
(IDA) countries over the 1990–2010 period for three types of debt: (i) foreign currency loans indexed 
to real gross domestic product (GDP); (ii) foreign currency loans indexed to the dollar value of 
exports; and (iii) inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currency. We find that both GDP 
indexation and domestic currency lending are feasible policies, since individual country risk could 
be easily diversified in a portfolio of loans to IDA countries. The estimation of capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) beta coefficients suggests that, while the risk of export-indexed loans is difficult to 
hedge, loans indexed to GDP or denominated in local currencies could be introduced at current 
interest rates; their risk premium is no greater than one per cent. The insurance that indexed debt 
might offer to LICs against macroeconomic shocks threatening their debt sustainability depends on 
the conditional covariances of GDP growth, real exchange-rate depreciation and net exports that we 
estimate as the covariances of the forecast errors obtained from a VAR model. The analysis shows 
that GDP-indexed or export-indexed loans would help to stabilize the debt ratio of the majority of 
IDA countries in our sample, but a larger number of them would benefit from a re-denomination of 
loans in local currency. A main lesson from our analysis is that a ‘one size fits all solution’ does not 
exist to the problem of stabilizing the debt ratio. This suggests that a reform of multilateral lending 
that is desirable to all LICs would be difficult to implement.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly held that, by introducing greater state contingency in sovereign debt contracts, GDP-
indexed bonds may help stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio, reduce the likelihood of debt crises and sovereign 
defaults and limit the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy (see e.g. Borensztein and Mauro, 2004; Griffith-Jones 
and Sharma, 2006). The idea is that indexed debt can provide valuable insurance since its payments are 
linked to the underlying conditions of the borrower, notably those that impact on its capacity to pay. 
While debt instruments can either be indexed to GDP, exports or commodity prices, their key feature is 
that cash flows – coupons, principal or both – are linked to the borrower’s ability to pay; they imply lower 
payments in times of output contractions, export shortfalls or terms of trade shocks, that is, precisely 
when a country struggles to honour its debt.
* The authors are associated with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Università degli 
Studi di Milano, respectively; e-mail: alessandro.missale@unctad.org and emanuele.bacchiocchi@unimi.it.
2In this paper, we evaluate the potential for introducing indexation on loans provided by multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) to low income countries and thus whether a reform of their lending policy is 
feasible and economically justified. In particular we investigate whether multilateral loans either indexed 
to GDP, or exports or denominated in domestic currency can reduce the LICs’ vulnerability to adverse 
shocks to GDP, the exchange rate and net exports that threaten their debt sustainability. To this end, we 
provide new evidence for a group of 40 IDA countries over the 1990–2010 period for three types of debt: 
(i) foreign currency loans indexed to real GDP; (ii) foreign currency loans indexed to the dollar value of 
exports; and (iii) inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currency.
We extend the literature in several directions. We compare the benefits of GDP-indexed loans to other types 
of indexation: export-indexed loans and inflation-indexed loans denominated in domestic currency. In 
doing so, we pay particular attention to the currency denomination of debt obligations, an issue that has so 
far been neglected, studying to what extent GDP or export indexation can also reduce debt vulnerabilities 
arising from the exposure to real exchange-rate risk. 
To assess the feasibility for multilateral lenders of a programme of indexed lending, we examine the 
potential for risk diversification, studying the risk-return characteristics of a portfolio of indexed loans 
to a group of 40 IDA countries. Portfolio risk analysis shows that individual country risk could be easily 
diversified, since the volatility of the MDB portfolio is much lower than the average volatility of individual 
loans for all types of indexation considered. The estimation of beta coefficients for individual country loans 
from a CAPM, where the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) growth is 
taken as the relevant market-portfolio return, suggests that the risk of export-indexed loans is difficult to 
hedge because IDA countries’ exports are strongly correlated with OECD growth and thus with the fiscal 
resources of multilateral lenders. By contrast, loans indexed to GDP or denominated in local currencies 
could be introduced at current interest rates because their risk premium is no greater than one per cent, 
while multilateral lenders would gain from a lower risk of debt distress.
More importantly, we investigate the role of indexed loans in reducing IDA countries’ vulnerability to 
adverse shocks to output, exports and the real exchange rate, in a model where indexed debt helps to 
stabilize the debt ratio and thus reduce the likelihood of a debt crisis. The optimal type of indexation 
depends on the conditional variances and covariances of GDP growth, real exchange-rate depreciation 
and net exports that we estimate as the covariances of the forecast errors obtained from a VAR model of 
each IDA country over the period between 1990 and 2010.
We find strong evidence in favour of domestic currency loans indexed to inflation and some support to 
GDP indexation. Lending in the borrower’s currency helps to stabilize the debt ratio against unanticipated 
movements in the real exchange rate that is the main cause of debt vulnerability. We also find supportive 
evidence for GDP-indexed loans, but while such instruments provide valuable insurance to a majority 
of IDA borrowers in our sample, they benefit a fewer number of countries than domestic currency loans. 
A main lesson from our analysis is that a ‘one size fits all solution’ does not exist to the problem of 
stabilizing the debt ratio.
A more serious obstacle for the introduction of GDP-indexed loans is that the MDB and the borrowing 
country must agree upon a country-specific baseline trend of GDP, since amortization payments must be 
indexed to deviations of realized GDP from its baseline trend for such loans to be attractive to countries 
with a high growth potential. On the other hand, lending in local currency is problematic because the real 
exchange rate of LICs tends to appreciate in the long run and at different rates in different countries. For 
LICs to be willing to borrow in local currency instead of conventional foreign currency loans, either the 
amount of transferred resources or their concessionality would have to be adjusted to individual countries’ 
expected real appreciations. In the case of GDP indexation, the borrower would want to claim that its 
growth prospects are strong in order to set the highest possible baseline trend for GDP and thus reduce 
future debt payments. Were loans denominated in local currency, the borrower would overstate expected 
real appreciation to ask for a greater concessionality on its debt. On the other hand, the MDB would want 
3to ensure itself an expected level of reflows comparable to those on conventional loans. As a result, both 
in the case of GDP indexation and domestic currency lending, a conflict of interests is likely to arise in 
the design of a contingent loan contract and an agreement may be difficult to reach.
After this introduction, in section II we review the literature on GDP-indexed debt and discuss the 
benefits of indexation in section III. Then, in section IV, we examine alternative indexing methods and 
their implications to identify an optimal scheme for MDBs’ loans. In section V, we present preliminary 
evidence on the main risks affecting IDA countries. In section VI, we develop a simple model where the 
choice of debt instruments helps to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio and reduce the probability that the 
debt becomes unsustainable. This allows us to derive the optimal shares of GDP-indexed debt, export-
indexed debt and domestic currency debt as a function of the stochastic relations between GDP growth, 
net exports and real exchange-rate depreciation. In section VII, these relations are estimated for a group 
of 40 IDA countries as the covariances of the forecast errors of VAR models for each country. In section 
VIII, we examine the cost for the MDBs of providing contingent loans to LICs by empirically investigating 
the extent of risk diversification accomplished by a portfolio of loans to a group of IDA countries. In 
section IX, we discuss the arguments against indexation. Section X concludes with policy implications.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Contingent debt contracts fall into two main categories. The first type of indexed debt has payments 
linked to an exogenous variable, that is, one out of the debtor country’s control. Relevant examples of 
exogenous variables are the price of a country’s export commodity or the growth rate of industrialized 
countries. A strong case for commodity-indexed debt was first made by Besley and Powell (1989) who 
called for intervention by multinational institutions in developing a market for such debt.1
The second type of indexed debt has payments linked to an endogenous variable which is at least partly 
under the control of the debtor country. A first proposal in this direction can be dated back to the work 
of Bailey (1983) who argued for converting the external debt into proportional claims on exports. Other 
possible endogenous indices are the country’s total output or its trade balance. Lessard (1987) and 
Helpman (1989) contended that some sort of output indexation might be beneficial as a risk-sharing or 
hedging mechanism: risk-averse countries could shift some of their exposure to better diversified lenders.
Krugman (1988), Froot et al. (1989) and Kletzer et al. (1992) considered the relative merits of indexing 
debt to exogenous versus endogenous variables. This literature took for granted the insurance benefits 
of indexing the debt to variables proxying for the country’s ability to pay; it did not investigate whether 
a greater insurance could be provided by indexing to commodity prices or GDP or exports and focused 
instead on the incentive effects and moral hazard costs of indexation. For instance, Krugman (1988) 
argued in favour of commodity-price indexation to minimize the risk of moral hazard implied by the 
debtor’s ability to affect exports.
Although commodity-indexed debt may be as good an instrument for insurance and risk sharing as 
GDP- or export-indexed debt, in this paper we focus on the latter types of indexation for two reasons. 
First, while a few experiments have been made with commodity-price indexation, much less is known 
regarding GDP indexation despite the Argentine experiment and a growing literature on the benefits 
(and pricing) of GDP-indexed bonds.2 Second, we are interested in studying the potential for introducing 
indexation on loans provided by Multilateral Development Banks to low income countries and thus in a 
1 More recently, recommendations for emerging countries to issue commodity-indexed debt have been made by Haldane 
(1999), Daniel (2001), Caballero (2003a, 2003b) and Atta-Mensah (2004). 
2 See Griffith-Jones and Sharma (2006) and Costa et al. (2008) for a review of the Argentine and other experiences with 
GDP indexation.
4reform of lending policy that could find the largest possible application and not be confined to specific 
export producers as is the case with commodity-price indexation.
Interest in GDP indexation has been recently revived by the work of Shiller (1993, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
and Borensztein and Mauro (2004). With the aim to improve international risk sharing, Shiller proposes 
to create ‘macro markets’ for GDP-linked securities, taking the form of perpetual claims on a fraction 
of a country’s GDP. Borensztein and Mauro propose the introduction of bonds with coupon payments 
augmented by the issuing country’s GDP growth rate to reduce cyclical vulnerability and the probability 
of debt crises. In their view, GDP-indexed bonds should provide insurance against output contractions 
and act as an automatic stabilizer mechanism, allowing for greater flexibility in fiscal policy.3 Indexed 
bonds should limit the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies, stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio and thus reduce 
the likelihood of costly debt crises and sovereign defaults.
The literature on debt management has also emphasized the potential benefits of GDP-indexed bonds in 
supporting optimal taxation. By providing a hedge against shocks affecting the income tax base, GDP-
indexed bonds would minimize tax-rate adjustments and their costs (see e.g. Barro, 1995 and Missale, 
1997).
The case for GDP indexation has been further put forth by Griffith-Jones and Sharma (2006) and 
Kamstra and Shiller (2010), while issuers’ and investors’ concerns have been addressed in two studies 
by the UN (2005, 2006) with the aim to solve the problems for their introduction and define a strategy 
for implementation. In fact, the introduction of GDP-indexed bonds runs into various difficulties. A first 
problem is the delay with which estimates of GDP become available and then later, sometimes substantial, 
revisions. A second problem is the complexity of the instrument that makes its pricing a difficult task. 
As a result, the empirical literature on pricing GDP-indexed bonds has grown fast (see e.g. Kruse et al., 
2005; Pernice and Fagundez, 2005; Chamon and Mauro, 2006; Costa et al., 2008 and Ruban et al., 2008).
Pricing difficulties are instead not an obstacle for indexing non-marketable loans as those provided by 
MDBs to LICs. This makes the introduction of indexed loans by MDBs a more realistic project whose 
chances of success are worth investigating. A few papers exist, closely related to our analysis, that 
examine the potential for a reform of multilateral lending. Guillaumont (2003) and Cohen and Reisen 
(2007) contend that MDBs should provide loans to LICs with amortization payments indexed to the 
value of their exports. Tabova (2005) proposes to make such payments conditional on the growth rate of 
GDP. In particular, she examines the effectiveness of a scheme that partially exempts countries from debt 
service when growth is lower than expected using historical simulations of debt service to IDA. Drèze 
(2000b) suggests the use of GDP-indexed bonds (with a deductible) as part of a strategy to restructure 
the debt of the poorest countries. From a different perspective, Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) and Levy 
Yeyati (2007) argue that MDBs should provide inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currencies 
to reduce the exposure of low income countries to real exchange-rate movements which are a main cause 
of debt vulnerability.
3 See Obstfeld and Peri (1998) and Drèze (2000a) for a discussion of the stabilization role of GDP-indexed bonds in 
advanced economies.
5III. THE BENEFITS OF INDEXED DEBT
Although contingent debt, and in particular GDP-indexed debt, would be a powerful instrument for 
international portfolio diversification and risk sharing,4 here we focus on the insurance benefits for low 
income countries and multilateral lenders.
A. The benefits for borrowing countries
Contingent debt contracts provide insurance benefits to debtor countries and their citizens against 
shocks affecting their income, net exports and tax revenues. In particular, GDP-indexed debt stabilizes 
the debt-to-GDP ratio against output contractions and slow growth while export-indexed debt limits 
the accumulation of external debt due to terms-of-trade shocks. Hence, indexed debt makes a country’s 
debt position resilient to adverse shocks and enhances its sustainability. By linking debt payments to the 
borrower’s ability to pay, debt either indexed to GDP or exports reduces the likelihood of debt crises and 
default. Furthermore, to the extent that indexation provides automatic relief to countries in distress, it 
disposes of explicit debt relief and of its related renegotiation and administrative costs.
Secondly, indexed debt makes fiscal policy less procyclical by acting as an ‘automatic-stabilizer’ 
mechanism. It does so by reducing the need for fiscal adjustment in bad times, when output or exports are 
lower than expected, and by forcing fiscal moderation in good times when GDP or exports are unexpectedly 
high. The ‘fiscal space’ created by a lower debt service during economic downturns can be particularly 
valuable because of the difficulties faced by debtor countries to access private capital markets. Moreover, 
indexed debt can benefit the poor in that it reduces pressure to cut spending for social programmes in bad 
times. As a built-in mechanism for macroeconomic stability, indexed debt is also beneficial for growth.5
B. The benefits of indexed debt for multilateral lenders
By reducing the likelihood that debtor countries run into repayment difficulties and eventually file for 
debt relief, indexed debt would not only be in the interest of the borrowers but also in that of multilateral 
lenders. They would both benefit from a lower risk of debt distress and a lower frequency of debt crises. 
Of course, it can be argued that explicit debt relief provides a simpler alternative than contingent debt to 
cope with adverse economic circumstances that impair the debtors’ ability to pay. However, providing 
explicit insurance against macroeconomic shocks can be a more effective policy to deal with repayment 
difficulties because it avoids delays in delivering assistance, and saves on the costs of debt renegotiation 
and conditionality associated with explicit debt relief. Furthermore, to the extent that explicit relief is 
a sign of the lender’s failure to evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrower or the profitability of the 
projects, reputational costs can be quite high.
Second, and importantly, to the extent that debt payments are contingent on economic performance, 
multilateral lenders need not decide in advance which countries are worth receiving large loans and 
which countries should instead obtain small grants, as it currently happens for IDA assistance under the 
debt sustainability framework (DSF). As poor growth or export performance would reduce payments 
on indexed loans and make them similar to grants, indexed loans could also be extended to countries 
where debt sustainability is considered at risk. As a matter of fact, debt sustainability is a forward looking 
concept; it depends on future economic growth which is hard to predict. Evaluating debt sustainability 
4 GDP-indexed bonds would allow investors to take an equity-like position in a foreign country’s GDP.
5 A further advantage of GDP indexation is that it supports optimal taxation. By providing a hedge against shocks to the 
tax base, GDP-indexed debt allows to minimize variations in tax rates and thus the welfare losses from tax distortions.
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almost impossible task.
However, for a programme of indexed lending to be viable at the same expected costs of conventional 
lending, it must work as an insurance scheme. This requires that lower payments from countries 
experiencing low growth be offset by higher payments from fast growing countries. In other words, for 
MDBs to extend indexed loans to a larger number of countries at the same expected cost, opportunities 
for risk diversification must exist; GDP or export risk should not be correlated across countries for a 
diversified portfolio of loans to limit the MDBs’ exposure to systematic risk. Finally, GDP-indexed or 
export-indexed debt enables investors to take an equity-like position in the borrower country. As GDP and 
export growth are main goals (together with poverty reduction) of multilateral lenders, it seems natural 
that MDBs would take a position on LICs’ future growth prospects.
While in theory the potential benefits of contingent debt are undisputed, their practical relevance remains 
an open question. In fact, empirical research on GDP indexation has mainly focused on the investor side of 
the problem, for instance, by examining the extent of risk diversification provided by portfolios of GDP-
indexed bonds from different issuers or by evaluating how such bonds would be priced by the market. 
By contrast, little attention has been paid to measuring the benefits of indexation for borrowers. Indeed, 
empirical research has been confined to case studies and has mainly relied on a counterfactual analysis 
of the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio in case of GDP indexation. Furthermore, scant attention has been 
paid to the currency denomination of external debt, and in particular to the relation between currency and 
output risk notwithstanding the vulnerability of debt positions to exchange rate devaluations. As external 
debt is usually denominated in hard currencies, whether GDP or export indexation can provide insurance 
against exchange rate risk is a relevant issue to address.
In what follows, we try to fill these gaps focusing in the next section on the type of indexation and then 
presenting a model of debt stabilization to empirically assess the insurance benefits that different types 
of indexation may offer to low income countries.
IV. CHOOSING THE TYPE OF INDEXATION
The relevant feature of indexed loans, independently of whether they are indexed to GDP, exports or 
commodity prices, is that their cash flows – coupons, principal or both – are linked to the borrower’s 
ability to pay; they imply lower payments in times of output contractions, export shortfalls or terms of 
trade shocks, that is, precisely when a country struggles to repay its debt.
Different types of indexed bonds have been proposed in the literature which vary depending on the 
reference variable to which payments are linked, their indexation method, and the type of index. 
However, since not all types of indexed bonds are equally suited for achieving the objectives suggested 
in the literature and, more importantly, not all of them will work if applied to non-marketable loans, a 
preliminary discussion of their characteristics and functioning is in order.
In what follows, we briefly consider the choice of the reference variable to which loans should be indexed 
that is closely intertwined with their currency denomination and, then, focus on the indexation scheme.
Currency denomination
The multilateral debt of low income countries is denominated in foreign currencies. As the resources 
available to MDBs are in hard currencies, it seems natural, at first sight, that they lend in United States 
dollars and special drawing rights (SDRs); if loans were denominated in local currencies, MDBs would 
have to bear the currency risk and additional hedging costs. It is however well known that foreign currency 
7denomination is a major source of vulnerability for debtor countries, as exchange-rate depreciations 
increase the real burden of their debt and can make it unsustainable. This raises the issue of whether 
multilateral lenders should rather assume the currency risk and immunize debtor countries from the 
disruptive effects of exchange rate movements. Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) have argued that MDBs 
should lend to low income countries in their local currencies to help them redeem from the ‘original sin’.
A possible explanation for why MDBs may insist on denominating their loans in hard currencies is 
to remove inflationary temptations. In principle, the problem could be solved by indexing domestic-
currency loans to the price level. However, if the incentive to monetize the debt is not fully removed and 
inflation leads to greater currency depreciation, then inflation-indexed debt fails to protect multilateral 
lenders from real exchange-rate depreciations. A second reason why multilateral debt is denominated in 
foreign currencies is to set incentives against ‘competitive devaluations’ (besides avoiding exposure to 
exchange-rate risk). While price indexation can provide an alternative to foreign currency denomination, 
inflation-indexed debt works as a discipline device only to the extent that a currency depreciation leads to 
higher inflation. These problems notwithstanding, it is worth exploring the potential of domestic currency 
loans in stabilizating the debt ratio.
Reference variable
The aim of indexed loans is to link the debt service of the borrowing country to its economic performance 
and therefore to its ability to pay. To this purpose, the GDP of a country is the most obvious indicator. 
There are, however, many other variables to which debt payments could be indexed; for example, the 
value of exports, tax revenues and key commodity prices. As regards to whether loans should be linked 
to nominal or real variables much depends on their currency denomination. Consider, for example, GDP 
indexation. If the loans are denominated in foreign currencies, say, United States dollars or SDRs, then 
a linkage to real GDP in local currency units is needed to prevent the issuing country from the double-
charge of balancing the inflation rate and paying for an associated depreciation of the local currency. On 
the other hand, if the loans were denominated in local currencies, they should be linked to nominal GDP 
(in local currency units) for two reasons. Firstly, linkage to nominal GDP would provide insurance to 
the borrower against unexpected deflation and thus help to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. Secondly, as 
discussed before, nominal indexation would remove inflationary temptations and offer some protection 
to the lender against a depreciation of the exchange rate.
Finally, it is worth noting that, if the debt is denominated in foreign currencies, indexation to current 
dollar GDP is also a possibility. In fact, this type of indexation is studied in Ruban et al. (2008). It is, 
however, clear that the indexation of foreign currency debt to nominal GDP in dollars is equivalent to 
borrowing in domestic currency and indexing payments to nominal GDP in local currency units (except 
for the cross-currency devaluation effects that may arise if the foreign currency debt is not entirely 
denominated in dollars).
Another possibility is to link debt payments to the value (in dollars) of exports of goods and services. 
A linkage to nominal exports is justified by two reasons. First, data on exports are more difficult to 
manipulate and more timely measured than GDP. Second, they are the main source of foreign exchange 
needed to service the country’s external debt obligations.
In our analysis we shall examine three types of indexation: (i) foreign currency loans indexed to real 
GDP in local currency units; (ii) foreign currency loans indexed to the dollar value of exports; and 
(iii) inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currencies. Instead, we do not consider indexation 
to specific commodity prices since this solution is appealing only to countries with particular export 
structures while we are interested in a reform of multilateral lending that could possibly apply to the 
largest number of low income countries.
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The issue of how bonds or loans should be indexed is rarely addressed in literature. Indeed, proposals of 
introducing GDP indexation have, so far, paid scant attention to the implications of alternative indexing 
methods. In this section, we try to fill the gap by discussing how alternative schemes perform in enhancing 
the sustainability of low income countries’ debts. We first focus on bonds, since they are more easy to 
understand and then extend our considerations to non-marketable loans. For simplicity, we refer to bonds 
indexed to GDP, but our analysis equally applies to other reference variables.
While there are many variants of indexed bonds, they fall into two main categories: capital indexed bonds 
and interest indexed bonds. The way they work is as follows.
Capital indexed bonds
Capital indexed bonds have the principal linked to GDP. Therefore all payments (coupons and principal 
redemption) are adjusted to the accumulated growth of GDP from the time of issuance to the payment date. 
For instance, the interest payments are obtained by applying the fixed coupon to the principal multiplied 
by the ratio of the most recent value of GDP to the value of GDP at the time of issuance. The redemption 
payment is also adjusted to the accumulated growth over the time to maturity as follows: 
 Interest 0 0
0
tGDPPayments r D
GDP
=
 Redemption 0
0
tGDPPayment D
GDP
=  
(1)
where 0r  is the fixed coupon, 0D  is the principal, the period t  refers to the date of the coupon payment, 
0  indicates the time of issuance and T  the maturity date.
Capital indexed bonds are well understood since the indexing method is the same as that applied for 
inflation-indexed bonds currently issued in the United States and other advanced economies. A key 
feature of such bonds is that all payments are symmetrically linked to GDP developments and thus can 
be above or below par, though the contract could require a minimum redemption equal to par value (see 
Schröder et al., 2004, 2007).6 The Shiller’s (1993) proposal of selling perpetual claims on a fraction of 
a country’s GDP can be viewed as a special case of Capital indexed bonds with infinite maturity and 
coupons adjusted each year in response to the cumulated growth up to that year.
Interest indexed bonds
Interest-indexed bonds are bonds with coupons augmented with the growth rate of GDP. Specifically, they 
bear a floating coupon rate equal to the sum of a fixed rate and a variable component equal to the growth 
rate of GDP (above a baseline growth rate) over the entitlement period of the coupon (or over the most 
recent period for which data are available). Thus, coupons are adjusted each period in response to the 
growth of GDP in that period alone. A minimum coupon rate equal to zero is required to avoid negative 
interest payments. Redemption is at par, i.e. the redemption payment is equal to the principal. In formulae:
 Interest 0 0[ 0]tPayments max r g g D
∗= + − ;
 Redemption 0Payment D=  
(2)
6 However, variants of capital indexed bonds where only interest payments are indexed to GDP have also been considered 
in the literature.
9where gt is the growth rate of GDP over the period between the current and the previous interest payment 
and g∗  denotes the baseline growth rate of GDP specified in the contract prior to the bond’s issue.
This indexation scheme is that originally proposed by Borensztein and Mauro (2004), but various types 
of interest-indexed bonds have been considered in the literature (see e.g. Ruban et al., 2008). The main 
differences arise because of the introduction of minimum and/or a maximum coupon rates, that is, floors 
or caps to interest payments.7 In fact, a more general specification for the coupon payment is
 Interest 0 0{ [ ]}
c f
tPayments min r max r g g r D
∗= ; + − ;  (3)
where cr  and fr  denotes the maximum (cap) and minimum (floor) coupon rates, respectively.
If negative payments were allowed, the precise setting of the fixed-rate component of the coupon and the 
baseline growth rate would be of little or no consequence. Indeed, if the market were perfect, alternative 
choices of these parameters would just affect pricing; i.e. they would translate into deviations of issuance 
price above or below par. However, insofar as negative payments are infeasible, the difference between 
the fixed rate and the baseline growth rate determines the extent of insurance that such bonds provide 
against a fall in GDP growth. A high fixed rate and a low baseline growth rate are needed for insurance, 
since growth rates lower than  
1
( )mg r0     g 
 ∗= −  −  would have no effects on interest payments (as well as 
on the redemption value). This unpleasant implication of interest indexed bonds is exacerbated by the 
presence of a minimum coupon rate, fr , since the floor below which the growth rate becomes irrelevant 
is raised to 
2 0
( )fmg r r g
∗= − − . The issuance of interest indexed bonds can be viewed as the sale of a 
call option on GDP growth. As a premium is paid by investors, the expected cost of debt service decreases 
but the relief that the borrower obtains for very bad realizations of GDP is limited.
B. Choosing the indexation scheme for MDB loans
There is a main difference between Interest indexation and capital indexation. With Interest indexation, 
GDP fluctuations substantially change the flow of interest payments while leave the redemption or the 
amortization payments unaffected, whereas with Capital indexation such payments adjust to the level of 
GDP that has instead a small impact on interest payments. Hence, the insurance that an interest-indexed 
scheme provides is front loaded and comes earlier than needed, i.e. before debt redemption, while, with 
capital indexation, insurance is back loaded and works by adjusting the principal or amortization payments 
to the borrower’s capacity to pay. This makes capital indexation particularly suited for 40-year IDA loans 
which pay a service charge of only 0.75 per cent, and have a back-loaded repayment profile: after an 
initial grace period of 10 years, 2 per cent of the IDA loan is repaid in each of the following 10 years, 
and a yearly 4 per cent over the remaining twenty years.
These considerations suggest that capital-indexed loans are a better hedge against the repayment difficulties 
that low income countries may encounter due to the unsatisfactory performance of their economies. As 
discussed in the previous section, the requirement of non-negative interest payments imposes a further 
limitation to the insurance that interest-indexed loans provide against a substantial fall in GDP; debt service 
would be insensitive to large negative realizations of GDP, that is, exactly when relief is most valuable. 
Although, in principle, the problem could be solved by setting a sufficiently high fixed-rate component 
for the coupon, this solution runs against the concessionality of multilateral loans. The alternative of 
7 Other differences mainly concern the continuity and elasticity of payments with respect to changes in economic growth 
(see Borensztein and Mauro, 2004).
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providing further transfers to countries experiencing severe output contractions also seems unpractical. 
Capital-indexed loans offer a better insurance against extreme events in that capital indexation makes 
debt service payments a continuous function of GDP.
A further advantage of capital indexed loans is that they link the debt service to the development of GDP 
and thus to the borrower’s ability to pay, whereas payments on interest-indexed loans do not necessarily 
conform with the borrower’s paying ability, as the interest payments might turn quite high in a recovery 
from a recession while in fact the GDP has decreased since the date of issuance. To the extent that ensuring 
debt sustainability is a main concern in lending to low income counties, adjusting the debt burden to 
their ability to pay is a valuable feature of capital indexed loans. On the other hand, interest indexed 
loans are better instruments for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Their interest payments help to stabilize 
the government budget against output fluctuations and provide ‘fiscal space’ for counter-cyclical policy 
during downturns.8
Hence, the choice of the indexing method hinges on the policy goal that is aimed for. To the extent that 
insurance and debt sustainability are more important objectives for low income countries than limiting the 
pro-cyclicality of their fiscal policies, capital indexed loans should be preferred to interest indexed loans.
C. Indexed MDB loans: a proposal
The introduction of capital indexation on non-marketable loans is not straightforward. Since GDP growth 
is expected to be positive and, in most countries, substantial, the interest and amortization payments on 
loans linked to the accumulated growth of GDP will rise, on average, well above their par implying a 
substantial increase in debt service compared to conventional loans. In the case of marketable bonds, this 
would not be a problem since positive expected growth would be priced in by the market and thus accounted 
for in an issuance price above the par value. By contrast, loans cannot rely on a market mechanism; their 
contract has to be properly designed to account for the expected accumulated growth and thus higher 
payments. Since the interest rate on concessional loans is already close to zero, a possible solution is to 
increase the amount disbursed for any given value of the principal. An equivalent but better solution is 
to index the interest and amortization payments to GDP relative to a baseline GDP. Hence, we propose 
the following indexing method: 
 Interest 0 0 *
t
t
GDPPayments r L
GDP
=
 Amortization 0 *
t
t
t
GDPPayments L
GDP
α=  
(4)
where 0r  is the fixed coupon rate (the fixed component of the interest rate), 0L  is the principal of the 
loan (the amount disbursed), 0tα ≥  is the fraction of the loan repaid in period t , and where tGDP
∗  
indicates the baseline level of GDP.
It is worth noting that the baseline GDP level, tGDP
∗ , is specified in the loan contract prior to the 
disbursement of the loan, say, at period 0 , for all future periods t  until the last payment on the loan. 
Thus, the baseline series of GDP has to be agreed upon by the two contracting parties, the MDB and 
the recipient country. It is then natural, though not necessary, to think that the MDB and the borrowing 
country set the baseline levels of GDP equal to its expected levels. They could agree upon the expected 
8 It is, however, worth noting that for interest-indexed debt to work as an automatic stabilizer, the delay in the release of 
GDP data should not be too long, otherwise this might lead to a situation in which payments are still high while in fact 
the economic circumstances have already deteriorated.
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annual growth rate of GDP over the repayment period of the loan and use this growth rate to derive the 
baseline series of GDP.
As the loan payments decrease with the specification of baseline growth, the drawing of an indexed contract 
may encounter serious difficulties. In particular, we expect the borrowing country to strongly bargain 
over baseline growth in order to obtain more favourable conditions. Multilateral loans are immune from 
the pricing difficulties which are major obstacle for the introduction of indexed bonds, but are sensitive 
to the contract design. The implementation of indexed loans requires that the MDB and the borrowing 
country agree upon the terms of the contract which may give rise to bargaining difficulties and lead to 
lengthy negotiations.9 We return to this issue in section IX.
V. THE NEED FOR INSURANCE: STYLIZED FACTS
A natural starting point to study the benefits of the three types of indexed loans, and their role in 
stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio, is to look at the volatilities of the growth rates of GDP, exports and the 
real exchange rate. Sudden changes in such variables may determine large variations in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio that make debt sustainability at risk. Evidence on the relative volatilities of GDP, exports and the 
real exchange rate may thus provide some preliminary indication of the main causes of debt vulnerability 
and the need for insurance.
Table 1 shows the standard deviations of the yearly growth rates of real GDP in local currency, of the dollar 
value of exports, and of the real exchange rate (more precisely, the dollar deflator) for 64 IDA countries 
and 31 high income OECD countries. The volatility of GDP growth for the IDA group is 5.4 per cent 
while it is only 2.9 per cent for OECD economies. Although it is well known that developing countries 
have a more unstable rate of GDP growth, the volatility of GDP growth in IDA countries is sizeable; it is 
almost two times that of industrialized countries. Interestingly, GDP growth appears to be more volatile 
in highly indebted countries, as shown by its 0.5 correlation with the debt-to-GDP ratio in 1999 (before 
the start of the enhanced HIPC initiative). Hence, it appears that the need for insurance is stronger at 
high levels of debt.
The volatility of the growth rate of the dollar value of exports is even larger; the standard deviation of 
export growth in the IDA group is 20.8 per cent, three times higher than the 6.7 per cent exhibited by OECD 
countries. This result does not depend on the presence of outliers, as shown by the maximum standard 
deviation and a median volatility only slightly lower than the average. Since exports are the main source 
of foreign exchange needed to service the external debt, their uncertainty exposes IDA countries to the 
risk of debt distress. However, export volatility is only weakly correlated with the debt ratio. Although 
insurance against export risk would clearly benefit low income countries, the most indebted would not 
gain more than the others.
IDA countries are also exposed to exchange rate risk because of the foreign currency denomination of 
their debts. Since their debt is in foreign currencies, their capacity to pay depends, not on the value of 
their GDP in constant local currency units, but on their GDP in current United States dollars. This implies 
that changes in the dollar deflator of GDP, i.e. in the real exchange rate, are destabilizing; their wealth 
effects are a major cause of debt vulnerability and crises. Table 1 shows that the rate of depreciation of 
the real exchange rate in IDA countries is 10 times more volatile than in OECD economies. Since this 
result is due to the presence of few episodes of hyper-devaluations, we computed the average standard 
deviation excluding three outliers.10 Despite this correction, the average volatility of the real exchange rate 
9 The specification of baseline growth is a minor problem in the case of marketable bonds because different values for 
baseline growth would be adjusted by changes in their issuance price according to market expectations of future growth.
10 We excluded Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nicaragua.
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Table 1
VOLATILITY OF GROWTH RATES:  GDP, EXPORTS AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES
IDA  
countries 
OECD  
countries IDA countries IDA countries  
 Corr. Rank corr.  
Average standard deviations Min. Max. with debt with debt  
GDP growth 5.4 2.9 0.8 31.8 0.53 0.27
(3.8) (2.3)
Exports growth 20.8 6.7 7.2 49.6 0.21 0.04
(19.2) (6.3)
RER dep. 103.5 9.3 2.2 4 512.1 0.23 0.55
Without outliers 17.6 9.3 2.2 74.3 0.49 0.49
(16.7) (9.3)
GDP nom. $ growth 14.9 10.7 4.2 30.1
(14.4) (10.6)
Note: Country averages of standard deviations. Median in parenthesis. 
remains high at 17.6 per cent, twice as large as in OECD economies. Highly indebted countries appear 
to be particularly exposed to real exchange-rate risk, since its correlation with the debt ratio is almost 
0.5. Hence, in countries with original sin, not only the real exchange rate matters for debt service, but it 
also tends to be significantly more volatile and the more so at high levels of debt.
It can however be argued that the GDP in current United States dollars is a more relevant indicator of a 
country’s ability to pay. If the real exchange-rate depreciates at times of high real GDP growth, then the 
volatility of GDP growth in current United States dollars would be lower than the sum of the volatilities 
of its two components. Table 1 shows that this is indeed the case. If we exclude countries with hyper-
devaluation episodes, the GDP growth in dollars is even more stable than the rate of real depreciation. 
However, the volatility of dollar GDP remains sizeable, 14.9 per cent, almost the same as that of the real 
exchange rate, 17.6 per cent. This finding suggests that the interaction between GDP-risk and currency 
risk deserves a particular attention.
We have so far examined the uncertainty of GDP, exports and the real exchange rate over one year which 
is a very short time horizon from the perspective of debt sustainability. In fact, it can be argued that 
the yearly volatilities of such variables do not matter much for the LICs’ capacity to pay since the debt 
they owe to multilateral creditors is very long term. To shed some light in this issue, table 2 reports the 
average growth rates of GDP and exports, and the rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate of IDA 
countries for two separate periods, between 1990 and 2000 and between 2000 and 2010. The result is 
striking: for a large number of countries there is a huge difference between the average growth rates in 
the two subperiods. Once viewed from a long-term perspective, the uncertainty surrounding the LICs’ 
capacity to pay is even worse than what the yearly volatilities may show. This evidence suggests that the 
performance of such countries over a long future horizon is very difficult to predict on the basis of their 
historical experience, and raises doubts on the reliability of the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) as a 
way to decide which countries are worth receiving large loans and which should instead obtain small 
grants, as it currently happens for IDA assistance under the DSF. Indeed, this evidence suggests that 
LICs are particularly vulnerable to unexpected events which play a major role in determining their debt 
sustainability. Then, the analysis should focus on the unanticipated variability of GDP, exports, the real 
exchange rate and their relations over long future horizons, as we do in what follows.
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Table 2
AVERAGE GROWTH RATES: 1990–2000 VERSUS 2000–2010 
GDP growth Export growth RER depreciation  
1990–2000 2000–2010 1990–2000 2000–2010 1990–2000 2000–2010 
Angola 1.2 11.4 12.3 24.5 -78.5 -15.1
Bangladesh 4.9 5.8 14.7 12.1 -0.3 -2.0
Benin 4.7 4.0 6.8 12.8 3.7 -6.6
Bhutan 5.5 8.5 n.a. n.a. 1.2 -4.5
Burkina Faso 4.8 5.7 4.8 19.0 6.1 -6.4
Burundi -1.4 3.2 0.3 17.5 3.1 -5.4
Cambodia 7.5 8.1 27.8 14.6 2.4 -3.7
Cameroon 0.8 3.3 2.0 8.8 3.0 -4.4
Central African Rep. 1.4 1.0 -2.8 n.a. 6.6 -6.2
Chad 1.9 8.9 0.8 n.a. 4.0 -9.1
Comoros 1.5 2.1 6.2 n.a. 2.3 -7.6
Congo (the) 1.4 4.7 9.1 14.3 -1.4 -9.5
Côte d’Ivoire 2.0 1.2 3.6 11.7 3.5 -6.5
Democratic Republic of the Congo -5.6 4.8 n.a. n.a. 1 815.0 -10.9
Djibouti -1.8 4.0 0.1 8.3 -3.9 -3.4
Eritrea 5.4 1.0 9.2 n.a. 1.4 -12.3
Ethiopia 3.0 8.5 4.3 17.4 9.0 -5.5
Gambia, The 3.3 3.9 5.6 10.1 -0.3 -2.0
Ghana 4.2 5.8 10.5 14.9 7.6 -15.7
Guinea 4.1 2.8 1.0 8.8 1.8 0.9
Guinea-Bissau 2.5 1.3 21.8 14.2 2.9 -15.4
Guyana 4.2 2.5 4.3 5.8 0.9 -10.8
Haiti 0.0 0.2 21.2 5.3 0.8 -5.7
Honduras 3.0 4.1 14.0 6.4 -3.5 -3.9
Kenya 2.1 4.1 6.0 12.8 -0.7 -5.1
Kiribati 3.5 1.1 16.4 n.a. -5.8 -6.4
Kyrgyzstan -2.6 4.1 8.3 17.4 -2.8 -8.4
Lao People’s Democratic Republic  6.2 7.2 19.2 18.0 0.7 -7.6
Lesotho 4.2 13.5 10.5 13.9 -0.4 -0.8
Liberia 3.4 1.8 n.a. 8.2 22.0 -4.8
Madagascar 1.9 2.8 9.5 2.8 -1.6 -4.8
Malawi 3.9 4.7 5.4 14.7 6.4 -7.6
Maldives 8.3 7.8 11.0 10.1 -1.1 -4.4
Mali 3.5 5.6 6.5 15.4 4.2 -7.9
Marshall Islands 1.3 1.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Mauritania 2.5 4.1 -1.9 n.a. 1.8 -8.9
Micronesia (Federated States of) 2.7 0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Mongolia -0.2 6.5 -0.6 20.5 41.9 -11.5
Mozambique 5.1 7.9 12.3 16.8 -0.5 0.1
Myanmar 6.8 12.1 23.0 15.3 n.a. n.a.  
Nepal 5.0 3.9 12.9 2.8 1.3 -5.8
Nicaragua 3.1 3.4 12.3 13.1 -142.4 -1.9
Niger (the) 1.6 4.6 -0.8 15.4 4.6 -6.6
Nigeria 3.3 6.4 13.3 17.2 -1.5 -8.9
Republic of Moldova -8.4 5.2 1.9 14.5 -7.7 -10.3
Rwanda 2.6 7.6 3.8 20.4 3.9 -4.9
Samoa 1.9 3.0 7.0 11.0 -7.1 -5.5
Sao Tome & Principe n.a. 6.3 4.7 5.7 n.a. -5.0
Senegal 2.8 4.1 1.5 10.6 5.7 -5.9
Sierra Leone -3.5 9.7 -2.9 24.5 1.5 -2.0
Solomon Islands 2.7 3.7 3.8 16.5 -1.1 -0.8
Sudan 4.8 6.4 13.9 23.0 15.5 -10.5
Tajikistan -7.7 8.4 n.a. 10.8 -7.3 -12.3
Togo 2.3 2.6 -0.6 12.7 4.5 -5.9
Tonga 2.4 1.1 -2.6 9.3 -3.0 -5.0
Tuvalu 3.3 2.0 n.a. n.a. -1.5 -5.8
Uganda 6.5 7.4 12.2 18.8 9.0 -3.0
United Republic of Tanzania 3.4 7.0 9.8 17.3 -4.6 -1.4
Vanuatu 4.2 3.2 10.7 5.9 -1.7 -6.1
Yemen 5.6 3.9 13.8 10.8 -0.8 -8.4
Zambia 0.7 5.6 -8.5 27.3 5.6 -10.7
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VI. A MODEL OF INDEXED DEBT AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
Multilateral loans either indexed to GDP, or exports or denominated in domestic currency can reduce 
LICs’ vulnerability to adverse shocks to GDP, the exchange rate and net exports that threaten their debt 
sustainability. In this section, we present a simple model where indexed loans may help to stabilize the 
debt ratio and thus reduce the likelihood of a debt crisis. The aim of the MDBs and the IDA countries is to 
ensure the sustainability of the external debt. This is accomplished, according to DSA, by implementing 
the necessary actions and lending strategies to maintain the debt-to-GDP ratio within a threshold limit TB  
that varies across IDA countries depending on the quality of their policies and institutions, as measured 
by the CPIA. To this end, a strategy is decided taking into account debt repayments and the possible 
realizations of output, inflation, the exchange rate, the current account and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows as outlined in stress test scenarios. The outcome of these efforts is however uncertain since 
unforeseeable events, i.e. bad shocks Z , could still put the external debt on an unsustainable path. A debt 
distress (or crisis) materializes if the debt-to-GDP ratio, 1tB + , exceeds the threshold level:
 1 1ˆ
T
t tB B Z B+ += + >  (5)
where Z  is a shock due to unforeseeable events, 1ˆ tB +  is the debt ratio prior to the shock, and 
TB  is 
the threshold level of the debt. Alternatively, Z , can be viewed as a shock to the current account, net 
transfers or FDI that occurs after the stabilization programme has been carried out, as discussed below, 
or as a debt increase due to the discovery of hidden liabilities.
The objective of the MDB and the IDA country is to minimize the probability that the debt becomes 
unsustainable, that is, that the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the threshold level, TB :11 
 
1
1 ˆ
ˆ[ ] ( )
T
t
T
t tt B B
MinE Prob Z B MinE Z dzB
+
∞
+ −
> − = Φ∫  (6)
where ( )ZΦ  is the probability density function of Z , and Et denotes expectations conditional on the 
information at time t.
The debt increases because of the interest payments on the outstanding debt minus the net-of-interest 
current account and the inflow of (non-creating debt) foreign direct investment. The evolution of the debt 
ratio also depends on the type of loans, on whether they are indexed or not, denominated in foreign or 
domestic currency. Consider, first, the case of conventional loans. As the latter bear a fixed interest rate 
and are denominated in SDRs or United States dollars, the debt ratio decreases with real GDP growth, g, 
and the growth rate of the dollar GDP deflator, eπ −  , i.e. with a real exchange-appreciation (assuming 
a zero foreign inflation). Hence, the dynamics of the debt ratio can be linearly approximated as:
 1 1 1 1 11ˆ (1 )t t t t t ttB Z r e g B nx ZB π+ + + + ++= + = + + − − − +  (7)
where r  is the fixed interest rate set at time t , 1te +  is the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, 1tπ +  
is the inflation rate, 1tg +  is the growth rate of real GDP, and 1tnx +  is the ratio of net exports to GDP. 
Note that we have set net transfers and FDIs equal to zero because they are not systematically correlated 
11 Alternatively, the problem could be modelled by, first, deriving the optimal adjustment to the deviation of the debt ratio 
from its threshold level and, then, by considering the ex-ante choice of the debt instrument. The analysis of the extended 
problem is not carried out since its implications for debt management are the same.
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with the other variables in the model. Alternatively, we may think that Z subsumes shocks to net transfers 
and FDIs.
In what follows we study the role of indexed loans and compare their performance with that of conventional 
loans in minimizing the probability that the debt ratio exceeds its threshold level. 
The first type of instruments we consider are loans indexed to real GDP and denominated in foreign 
currency. GDP-indexed loans have payments indexed to the ratio of real GDP to its baseline level GDP*, 
as discussed in section IV.C. If the whole debt is indexed to GDP, its ratio evolves as: 
 11 1 1 1 1*
1
(1 ) tt t t t t t
t
GDPB r e g B nx Z
GDP
γ π ++ + + + +
+
= + + − − − +  (8)
where rγ  is the fixed rate component of the interest rate. Noting that the ratio GDPt+1/GDP*t+1 can be 
log-linearized as *1 11 ( ) ( )t tln GDP ln GDP+ ++ −  and assuming that baseline GDP is set equal to expected 
GDP, the debt ratio is equal to
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 )(1 )t t t t t t t t tB r e g g E g B nx Z
γ π+ + + + + + += + + − − + − − +  (9)
where 1 1( ) ( )t t tg ln GDP ln GDP+ += −  is the accumulated growth of GDP between time t  and 1t + . 
Since MDBs’ loans have a long time to maturity we are concerned with debt service payments and debt 
accumulation over a long horizon ahead. For instance, in the case of IDA loans with a 40-year maturity 
and an initial grace period of 10 years during which no principal payment is required, the relevant time 
period should be, at least, 10 years. However, due to the unreliability of forecasts at horizon longer than 
10 years, in the empirical analysis of the next section we shall focus on two forecast horizons: a 5-year 
and a 10-year horizon. Therefore, we make the strong simplifying assumption that equation (8) displays 
debt accumulation over such long horizons and accordingly interpret 1tg +  as the 5-year or 10-year growth 
rate of GDP.
If both types of debt, conventional and GDP-indexed, are outstanding, then the debt ratio is linearly 
approximated by
       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 )(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t t t t tB r e g B r e E g B nx Z
γπ γ π γ+ + + + + + + += + + − − − + + + − − − +  (10)
where γ  is the share of GDP-indexed debt chosen in period t .
A. The choice of conventional versus GDP-indexed loans
The objective of the MDB, and the IDA country, is to minimize the probability that the debt ratio exceeds 
its sustainable level, TB , either because of unforeseeable events that lead to an unexpected increase in 
the debt ratio, or because of shocks to net transfers or FDIs. To this end, the MDB and the IDA country 
choose the share of GDP-indexed loans, γ , to minimize
 
1
1 ˆ
[ ] ( )
T
t
T
t t t B B
MinE Prob Z B B MinE Z dz
+
∞
+ −
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subject to the debt accumulation equation (10).
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Deriving (11) with respect to γ yields 
 1 1 1ˆ[( ) ( )] 0
T
t t t t tE r r g E g B B
γ
+ + +− + − Φ − =  (12)
where r rγ −  is the eventual risk premium on GDP-indexed loans, 1ˆ
T
tB B +−  is the distance of the debt 
ratio from its sustainable threshold in the absence of shocks, Z , and 1ˆ( )
T
tB B +Φ −  is a function of γ .
The first order condition (12) has a simple interpretation: it shows that the debt composition is optimal 
only if the opportunity cost of additional GDP-indexed lending is uncorrelated with the increase in the 
probability that debt stabilization fails. If this were not the case, the MDB could reduce this probability 
by changing the debt structure; e.g. it could substitute GDP-indexed loans for conventional loans or 
vice-versa.12
To gain further intuition, it is worth noting that the opportunity cost of GDP-indexed loans depends on the 
difference in the interest cost of GDP-indexed loans and conventional loans, r rγ − , and the unanticipated 
growth rate of GDP, 1 1t t tg E g+ +− . If the latter turned out to be negative, GDP-indexed loans would cost 
less than conventional loans.
The difference between the expected interest cost of GDP-indexed loans and conventional loans, r rγ − , 
depends on the MDB decision regarding the concessionality of GDP-indexed loans. As providing insurance 
is costly, the MDB may require a premium on such loans. This premium could however be small to the 
extent that GDP risk were uncorrelated across IDA countries and thus diversifiable in a portfolio of loans 
to such countries (see section VIII). Moreover, MDBs should trade off their greater exposure to GDP risk 
against the lower probability of repayment difficulties by IDA countries.
Finally, it is worth noting that equation (12) assumes that the baseline growth coincides with expected 
growth and that the MDB and the IDA country share the same expectations. If, for example, the IDA 
country expected a higher growth rate, i.e. 1 1
IDA
t t t tE g E g+ +> , then the perceived opportunity cost of 
servicing GDP-indexed debt would correspondingly increase to 1 1
IDA
t t t tr r E g E g
γ
+ +− + − . 
To derive an explicit solution for the optimal share, γ ∗ , of GDP-indexed debt we must specify 
the probability density function, ( )ZΦ . Since this function cannot be estimated, we take a linear 
approximation of ( )ZΦ  over the range of bad realizations, 0Z > , of the shock.13 This implies a triangular 
probability density function equal to
 2( )
Z ZZ
Z
−
Φ =  (13)
where Z  is the worst possible realization of the shock to debt accumulation, and 0Z > . The triangular 
density is the linear approximation of any density function decreasing with Z  (for 0Z > ); it implies 
that bad realizations of the shock, Z , are less likely to occur the greater is their size.
12 The argument assumes that there are non-negative constraints to the choice of debt instruments.
13 We assume that the strategy in the DSA is expected to stabilize the debt, so that 1ˆ
T
tB B +> .
17
Substituting equations (13) and (10) in the first order condition (12) yields the optimal share of GDP-
indexed debt:
                     1 1 1 12 2
1 1
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(14)
where ( )Var .  and ( )Cov .  denote variances and covariances conditional on the information available 
at time t , and 01t tE B
γ =
+  is the expected debt-to-GDP ratio when the share of GDP-indexed debt, γ , is 
equal to zero.
The optimal share, γ ∗ , depends on both risk and cost considerations. GDP-indexed debt is a perfect hedge 
against variations in the debt ratio due to output fluctuations but, to stabilize the debt ratio, it must provide 
insurance against real exchange-rate risk and net exports uncertainty. This requires a negative conditional 
covariance of GDP growth with the real exchange rate and a positive covariance with net exports.
A positive covariance of GDP growth with next exports makes indexed loans an even better hedge as 
it implies lower debt payments when net exports are unexpectedly low. If the real exchange rate tends 
to depreciate when growth is unexpectedly low, GDP-indexed debt helps to stabilize the debt ratio and 
reduce the risk of a debt crisis. This is because the increased burden of dollar denominated debt is hedged 
by lower payments on indexed loans. The case for indexation instead weakens as the conditional variance 
of GDP growth increases, thus producing unnecessary fluctuations in interest payments.
While GDP-indexed debt offers an insurance against low growth and, possibly, real exchange-rate 
depreciation, it may cost more to IDA countries than conventional debt. If MDBs ask for a premium on 
indexed loans, 0r rγ − > , this leads, on average, to greater debt accumulation. Debt sustainability thus 
implies a trade off between cost and risk minimization. The presence of a risk premium on GDP-indexed 
debt reduces the optimal share of such debt, as shown by the last term in equation (14). The impact of 
the risk premium increases as the debt ratio, 1tB +  approaches its maximum sustainable level, 
TB ; the 
higher the probability of debt distress the greater the importance of expected cost minimization relative 
to insurance effects. In other words, insurance is more valuable to countries with a more sustainable 
borrowing strategy. Finally, a greater variance of GDP growth reduces the impact of the expected cost 
differential of GDP-indexed debt on its optimal share as much as it reduces the importance of hedging.
B. The choice of conventional versus export-indexed loans
Although loans indexed to GDP growth are the natural instruments to stabilize the debt ratio against output 
fluctuations, their implementation runs into various difficulties due to misreporting and measurement 
problems. This raises the issue of whether loans to IDA countries could be indexed to variables that can 
be measured more precisely while being still correlated, though imperfectly, to output growth. In light 
of these considerations, loans indexed to the growth rate of the value of exports (measured in dollars) 
may offer an alternative to GDP indexation that is worth exploring. In this section we study the role of 
export-indexed loans, advocated by Guillaumont et al. (2003) and compare their performance to that 
of conventional loans in minimizing the probability that the debt ratio exceeds its threshold level. In 
particular, we consider loans with payments indexed to the deviation of nominal-export growth from its 
baseline (expected) value.
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Defining with 1tv +  the growth rate of the value of exports, the payments on export-indexed loans can be 
linearly approximated (as in the case of GDP indexation) by 1 1
x
t t tr v E v+ ++ − , where 1tv +  is equal to 
the sum of export-price inflation and the growth rate of real export, and where the baseline growth rate, 
1t tE v + , is assumed to be equal to the expected growth rate.
If both types of debt, conventional and export-indexed, are outstanding, then the debt ratio is equal to
              1 1 1 1(1 )(1 )t t t t tB r e g x Bπ+ + + += + + − − − +
 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 )
x
t t t t t t t tr v E v e g xB nx Zπ+ + + + + ++ + + − + − − − +  
(15)
where x  is the share of export-indexed debt chosen in period t . 
The problem of the MDB and the IDA country is to choose the share of export-indexed loans x  to 
minimize the probability that the debt ratio exceeds its sustainable level, TB , i.e. to minimize equation 
(11) subject to the debt equation (15).
Deriving (11) with respect to x  yields the following first order condition:
 1 1 1ˆ[( ) ( )] 0
x T
t t t t tE r r v E v B B+ + +− + − Φ − =  (16)
where xr r−  is the eventual risk premium on export-indexed loans, 1ˆ
T
tB B +−  is the distance of the debt 
ratio from its sustainable threshold (with 0Z = ), and 1ˆ( )
T
tB B +Φ −  is a function of x .
The first order condition (16) has the same interpretation as condition (12): it shows that the debt 
composition is optimal only if the opportunity cost of additional export-indexed lending is uncorrelated 
with the increase in the probability that debt stabilization fails. The opportunity cost of export-indexed 
loans depends on their expected interest-cost differential relative to conventional loans, xr r− , and on 
the unanticipated growth of the value of exports, 1 1t t tv E v+ +− .
To derive an explicit solution for the optimal share, x∗ , of export-indexed debt, we again rely on the 
triangular probability density function (13), that is, the linear approximation of the density function ( )ZΦ  
over the range of bad realizations, 0Z > , of the shock to debt accumulation.
Substituting equations (13) and (15) in the first order condition (16) yields the optimal share of export-
indexed debt:
           1 1 1 1 12 2
1 1
( ) ( ( ))
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t
x x
t t
Cov v g Cov v ex
Var v r r Var v r r
π∗ + + + + +
+ +
−
= −
+ − + −
 
0
1 1 1
2 2
1 1
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[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ]
T x
xt t t t
x x
t t t t
Cov v nx Z B E Br r
Var v r r B Var v r r B
=
+ + +
+ +
− −
+ − −
+ − + −
 
(17)
where ( )Var .  and ( )Cov .  denote variances and covariances conditional on the information available 
at time t , and 01
x
t tE B
=
+  is the expected debt-to-GDP ratio when the share of export-indexed debt, x , is 
equal to zero.
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The optimal share, x∗ , depends on both risk and cost considerations. Export-indexed debt is clearly not 
as good a hedge against output fluctuations as GDP-indexed debt, but it may provide a better insurance 
against the risk of a fall in export or a real depreciation. To this end, export growth should be positively 
correlated to net exports and negatively correlated to unexpected movements in the real exchange rate. 
While the first condition is likely to hold in practice, the relation between exports and the exchange 
rate is uncertain and may depend on the country considered. For instance, if export growth is driven by 
productivity improvements or terms of trade effects that lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate, export 
indexation helps to stabilize the debt ratio. On the other hand, if export growth is due to an exchange-rate 
depreciation driven by capital outflows, then indexation may introduce an additional source of instability. 
The case for indexation also depends on the conditional variance of export growth; a high volatility of 
exports reduces the scope for insurance as it produces unnecessary fluctuations in interest payments.
As in the case of GDP indexation, a trade-off between risk and cost minimization emerges if the MDBs 
ask for a premium on export-indexed loans, that is, if 0xr r− > . As the expected interest cost of export-
indexed loans exceeds that of conventional loans, the optimal share of indexed debt decreases, as shown by 
the last term in equation (17). The impact of the risk premium increases as the debt ratio, 1tB +  approaches 
its maximum sustainable level, TB .
If the expected cost of repaying indexed loans is greater than that of conventional loans this may affect 
debt accumulation and thus the sustainability of the borrowing strategy. It is then crucial to assess whether 
MDBs are ready to extend the concessionality of conventional loans to indexed loans. This depends, 
among other factors, on the possibility for the MDBs to reduce their risk exposure by holding a diversified 
portfolio of loans.
C. The choice of conventional versus domestic currency loans
Because the debt of IDA countries is denominated in foreign currencies, exchange rate movements are 
a major cause of variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) have thus argued 
that MDBs should lend to low income countries in their local currencies to help them redeem from 
the ‘original sin’. They also stress that domestic currency loans should be indexed to the price level to 
eliminate the debtor’s temptation to inflate it away. If inflation nevertheless occurs and leads to a currency 
depreciation, price indexation can still protect the dollar value of MDBs’ loans, but only to the extent 
that real exchange rate does not depreciates.
Although inflation indexation may not fully remove the incentives for opportunistic behaviour, it is worth 
comparing the performance of domestic currency loans to that of conventional loans in stabilizing the 
debt ratio.
The amortization payments in local currency of inflation-indexed loans are linearly approximated by 
1
h
tr π ++ , where 
hr  is the real interest rate. As it is standard practice with inflation indexed bonds, we 
do not link such payments to a baseline inflation rate. This implies that the real interest rate should be 
lower than the nominal rate on conventional loans, which could be problematic as the latter are highly 
concessional.
With both types of debt, conventional and inflation-indexed debt denominated in domestic currency, the 
debt ratio is equal to
 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 )(1 ) (1 )
h
t t t t t t t tB r e g h B r g hB nx Zπ+ + + + + += + + − − − + + − − +  (18)
Where h is the share of inflation-indexed debt denominated in the local currency.
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The MDB and the IDA country choose the share of domestic currency debt h to minimize the probability 
in equation (11) subject to the debt equation (15).
Deriving (11) with respect to h  yields the following first order condition:
 1 1 1ˆ( ) ( )] 0
h T
t t t tE r r e B Bπ + + +− + − Φ − =  (19)
It is worth noting that, in this case, the interest rate differential, hr r− , is not equal to the risk 
premium which is instead given by the expected return differential, 1 1
h
t t t tr E E e rπ + ++ − − . Defining 
1 1ˆ
hh
t t t tr E E er π + +≡ + − , the first order condition (19) can be written as
 1 1 1 1 1ˆ[ ( ) ( )] ( )] 0ˆ
Th
t t t t t t t tE r E e E e Br Bπ π+ + + + +− + − − − Φ − =  (20)
which has the usual interpretation, and where 1ˆ( )
T
tB B +Φ −  is a function of h .
Using the triangular probability density function (13) and equation (18) in the first order condition 
(20) yields the optimal share of domestic currency debt:
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(21)
where ( )Var .  and ( )Cov .  denote variances and covariances conditional on the information available 
at time t , and 01
h
t tE B
=
+  is the expected debt-to-GDP ratio when the share of domestic currency debt, h , 
is equal to zero.
Inflation-indexed debt denominated in local currency can stabilize the debt ratio against real exchange-
rate movements, as clearly shown by the first term in equation (21). If the latter were the only source of 
uncertainty, then providing loans in domestic currency would be optimal. However, output and exports 
uncertainty must also be considered. For instance, a positive covariance between the real exchange rate 
and net exports suggests a lower share of domestic currency loans. This is because a fall in exports due 
to a real appreciation would be better hedged by dollar denominated debt. On the other hand, a negative 
covariance between GDP growth and real depreciations strengthens the case for domestic currency debt. 
The latter would mostly benefit countries experiencing sudden stops and currency crises characterized 
by real depreciations and output contractions.
Finally, the optimal share of inflation-indexed loans in domestic currency decreases with their expected 
return differential with conventional loans, as shown by the last term in equation (21). This is because a 
greater cost of domestic currency loans increases debt accumulation and weakens the sustainability of 
the debt. Even if the MDBs were willing to extend the concessionality of conventional loans to domestic 
currency loans, the implementation of such a strategy could run into practical difficulties. In particular, to 
obtain the same expected return on both types of loans, the MDBs should set the interest rate on domestic 
currency loans equal to 1 1
h
t t t tr r E e E π+ += + − . If the real exchange rate is expected to appreciate, this 
requires a negative real interest rate, hr , given the low nominal rate , r , on conventional loans. More 
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importantly, as the expected movements in the real exchange rate differ across IDA countries, they would 
be asked to pay different interest rates on the same loans, which can be politically infeasible.
VII. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF INSURANCE OPPORTUNITIES
In this section, we empirically investigate whether multilateral loans indexed either to GDP, exports 
or inflation, may help to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio in IDA countries and thus enhance their debt 
sustainability. To this end, we evaluate the insurance that indexed loans can provide to a group of IDA 
countries through the estimation of the conditional variances and covariances of GDP growth, real 
exchange-rate depreciation and net exports (relative to GDP). The analysis aims to identify the optimal 
type of indexation by comparing the extent of hedging that the three types of indexed loans studied in 
the previous section can offer.
A. Estimation strategy
The theoretical model presented in section VI derives the optimal shares of indexed loans as functions 
of the variances and covariances of GDP growth, real exchange-rate depreciation and net exports over a 
long future horizon conditional on the information available at time t . More precisely, these variances 
and covariances represent the conditional second moments of the unanticipated components of future 
realizations of such variables.
Our empirical strategy is to recover the theoretical conditional variances and covariances from the 
estimation of the variances and covariances of forecast errors obtained from a vector autoregression 
(VAR) analysis of the relations between GDP growth, real exchange-rate depreciation and net exports. 
This approach appears particularly suitable in the present case for a number of reasons. First, the forecast 
errors capture both the deviation of the variable realization from the conditional mean (the forecast) and 
the error made in the forecast, for example, in estimating baseline GDP growth. Second, we are interested 
in the projected, out-of-sample, relations between the unanticipated components of the relevant variables. 
Third, we are interested in estimating such relations over a long future horizon, since IDA loans have a 
long maturity, typically of 40 years. Fourth, this approach is consistent with the stress tests of DSAs, but, 
unlike the latter that consider each shock separately, it captures the stochastic relations between shocks 
as estimated from VAR analysis.
The strategy used to estimate the variances and covariances of the forecast errors relies on a Data Generating 
Process for the macroeconomic variables that follows a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) process of the form
 1 1 0t t p t p t p t p t tY AY … A Y B X … B X φµ ε− − −= + + + + + + +  (22)
where tY  is the 1k ×  vector of dependent variables, tX  is the 1k ×  vector of exogenous variables, 
tµ  contains deterministic components, and ( )1 0p pA … A B … B φ, , , , , ,  are matrices of parameters to be 
estimated. Finally, tε  is a vector of error terms with the usual assumption tε  ~ ( )0N ,Σ .
The vector of endogenous variables contains the log of the real GDP (in local currency units), the log 
of the real exchange rate (i.e. the log of the reciprocal of the dollar deflator), the log of the dollar value 
of exports, and the ratio of net exports to GDP. The vector of exogenous variables, instead, contains 
the lagged United States long-term interest rate, the log of the real GDP of the OECD countries in the 
previous year, and the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio. Among the deterministic components we have considered 
a constant term and a linear trend.
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Given the presence of unmodelled exogenous variables, this kind of model is generally referred to VARX 
or dynamic simultaneous equations model (SEM).14
However, if the aim of the analysis is to forecast the dependent variables tY , and the future paths of the 
unmodelled variables are unknown to the forecaster, a simple and practical assumption is to model the 
exogenous variables tX  as a VAR ( )q  process
 1 1t t q t q t tX C X … C X vϕν− −= + + + + .  (23)
The two reduced form models for tY  and tX  can thus be considered together in one overall model of 
the form
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where it is assumed, without loss of generality, that p q≥  and, as a consequence, 0jC =  for j q> . 
Premultiplying by
 
1
0 0
0 0
k k
m m
I B I B
I I
−   
   
   
   
      
−
=  (25)
gives a standard reduced form VAR( p ) for t t tZ Y X
′′ ′ 
 
 
= ,  as
 1 1t t p t p t tZ Z … Z D uη− −= Π + +Π + +  (26)
for which the discussion of forecasting VAR( p ) processes applies. More precisely, the wold moving 
average decomposition for stable VAR( p ) processes is defined as
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1 1 2 2 2t t t t t t tZ u D u D u D …η η η− − − −= Φ + +Φ + +Φ + + ,  (27)
with 0 k mI +Φ =  and sΦ  computed recursively according to 
 
1
s
s s j j
j
−
=
Φ = Φ Π∑    for   1 2s …= , ,  (28)
whereby 0jΠ =  for j p> . Given the two representations for the stochastic process tZ , forecasts for 
horizons 1h ≥  can be generated recursively according to
14 For a detailed discussion of these models, see Lütkepohl (2005), chapter 10.
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 1 1t h t t h p t h p t hZ Z … Z Dη+ | + − + − += Π + +Π +  (29)
where t j t t jZ Z+ | +=  for 0j ≤ , while the forecast error covariance or MSE matrix can be obtained as
 ( )
1
1
h
z i u i
i
h
−
′
=
Σ = Φ Σ Φ∑  (30)
where uΣ  is the covariance matrix of the error term tu .
The first ( )k k×  block elements of ( )z hΣ  are the variances and covariances of the unanticipated 
components of the endogenous variables Yt+h|t at different horizons h .
We have estimated a VAR model for each IDA country and used the variances and covariances of the 
forecast errors at the 5- and 10-year horizons as an estimate of the conditional variances and covariances 
of accumulated GDP growth, real exchange-rate depreciation and net exports.15
B. Estimation results
To estimate the conditional variances and covariances in equations (14), (17) and (21), we use the 
covariances of the forecast errors in equation (30) obtained from a VAR model of each IDA country 
over the period between 1990 and 2010. Then, assuming that the MDBs will maintain the same expected 
grant element, and thus will not ask for a premium on indexed loans, we compute the optimal shares of: 
foreign currency loans indexed to real GDP, γ ∗ ; foreign currency loans indexed to the dollar value of 
exports, x∗ , and; inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currency, h∗ .
The optimal shares of the three types of indexed loans are reported in tables 3 and 4, for the 5-year and 
10-year horizons, respectively, for the sample of the 40 IDA countries for which data on exports are 
available to estimate the VAR.16 Each table shows the debt-to-GDP ratio in column 2, the risk of debt 
distress in column 3 (low, moderate, high, in distress), the ratio of the variance of exports to the variance 
of GDP in column 4, the ratio of the variance of real exchange rate depreciation to the variance of GDP 
in column 5, the optimal share of GDP-indexed loans in column 6, the optimal share of loans indexed 
to the value of exports in column 7, and the optimal share of inflation-indexed loans in local currency 
in column 8.
Tables 3 and 4 clearly show that GDP growth is not the main source of uncertainty affecting the debt ratio 
in IDA countries. In fact, the variances of the real exchange-rate and export growth (in dollars) exceed 
by many times that of accumulated GDP growth. While the specification of our VAR may be too simple 
to forecast the former variables at long horizons, it is well known that predicting the exchange rate is a 
difficult task, as it comes close to a random walk.
Despite the relatively low volatility of GDP growth, GDP-indexed loans would be a valuable hedge for many 
IDA countries. Indeed, the optimal share of such loans, γ ∗ , is positive in 29 out of 40 countries (at both 
time horizons) and larger than one in 25 cases at the 5-year horizon and in 28 cases at the 10-year horizon. 
15 The optimal number of lags for both the endogenous and exogenous variables has been determined by minimizing the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
16 Table 2 shows that data on exports are not available (or sufficient) to estimate a VAR for 25 IDA countries.
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Table 3
OPTIMAL SHARES OF INDEXED DEBT – 5-YEAR HORIZON 
 Relative variances Optimal shares  
Debt ratio Risk V(x)/V(g) V(e-p)/V(g) γ* x* h*
Angola 22 21.7 6.6 9.0 2.0 3.6
Bangladesh 25 L 228.9 33.4 4.4 0.2 0.9
Benin 18 L 249.1 339.3 -6.7 0.5 0.6
Burundi 33 H 82.7 12.0 -1.2 0.2 1.0
Cambodia 42 M 3.7 3.5 3.3 1.5 1.7
Cameroon 13 L 156.2 206.4 6.4 0.6 1.0
Congo (the) 32 L 35.5 58.9 10.0 1.7 1.3
Côte d’Ivoire 50 D 11.5 14.2 0.7 0.8 0.7
Djibouti 72 H 22.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.1 -1.6
Ethiopia 24 L 11.4 30.8 1.3 0.6 0.4
Ghana 27 M 3.3 118.4 15.5 5.3 1.5
Guinea 65 D 117.1 34.2 0.3 0.2 0.9
Guyana 61 M 2.7 15.3 5.6 3.1 1.3
Haiti 7 H 198.2 186.4 50.6 4.4 5.5
Honduras 27 L 6.5 3.1 -1.6 0.4 1.7
Kenya 27 L 182.1 149.9 0.9 -1.4 1.6
Kyrgyzstan 86 M 13.8 7.2 4.1 1.0 1.6
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 76 H 238.4 163.6 10.3 0.6 0.9
Lesotho 34 M 3.6 1.4 -0.2 0.4 2.0
Madagascar 26 L 5.4 7.0 -0.1 0.0 1.1
Malawi 18 M 5.6 18.1 5.6 0.5 -0.2
Maldives 64 H 6.1 0.6 3.0 1.3 1.7
Mali 25 M 30.3 22.6 6.3 1.0 1.5
Mongolia 39 L 24.1 8.8 6.5 1.7 1.5
Mozambique 43 L 40.1 35.6 -3.6 -0.4 1.4
Nepal 29 M 51.0 12.7 3.5 0.5 0.5
Nicaragua 73 M 28.0 121.1 2.5 1.5 1.2
Niger (the) 20 M 71.1 50.0 5.8 0.8 0.9
Nigeria 4 L 69.4 35.0 28.6 5.9 7.5
Republic of Moldova 79 L 11.9 3.3 2.1 0.6 1.2
Rwanda 14 M 2.8 0.6 5.7 2.6 4.8
Senegal 28 L 28.7 90.2 7.7 1.2 0.8
Sierra Leone 41 M 18.9 0.9 0.7 0.1 1.3
Solomon Islands 32 M 16.2 1.1 2.8 0.5 -0.1
Sudan 35 D 125.7 56.5 -1.4 0.7 1.0
Togo 55 M 9.7 12.0 -0.3 0.9 1.0
Uganda 18 L 39.6 13.2 3.1 0.6 1.5
United Republic of Tanzania 38 L 194.2 75.1 4.7 0.0 0.8
Vanuatu 21 L 8.3 10.9 -4.1 -1.1 -2.4
Yemen 24 H 58.1 110.8 -0.5 1.3 0.6
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Table 4
OPTIMAL SHARES OF INDEXED DEBT – 10-YEAR HORIZON 
 Relative variances Optimal shares  
Debt ratio Risk V(x)/V(g) V(e-p)/V(g) γ* x* h*
Angola 22 12.4 3.1 5.0 1.6 3.2
Bangladesh 25 L 138.1 17.9 2.8 0.2 0.9
Benin 18 L 55.4 16.4 1.8 -0.8 1.4
Burundi 33 H 14.7 3.7 -2.8 0.2 1.5
Cambodia 42 M 2.6 3.0 3.3 2.1 1.9
Cameroon 13 L 123.0 226.2 8.9 0.2 0.9
Congo (the) 32 L 35.9 59.1 5.8 1.0 0.7
Côte d’Ivoire 50 D 4.3 9.2 -0.5 0.8 0.5
Djibouti 72 H 14.1 0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -1.5
Ethiopia 24 L 10.0 134.8 1.5 0.6 0.3
Ghana 27 M 0.0 100.8 14.2 78.5 1.4
Guinea 65 D 1826.8 1293.3 12.0 0.7 0.9
Guyana 61 M 2.0 13.3 5.0 3.6 1.0
Haiti 7 H 191.8 203.8 82.2 5.9 5.8
Honduras 27 L 3.3 1.7 -2.3 1.4 2.2
Kenya 27 L 132.9 201.3 -12.3 -2.2 2.1
Kyrgyzstan 86 M 13.8 7.2 4.1 1.0 1.6
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 76 H 234.6 315.4 8.7 0.5 0.9
Lesotho 34 M 2.1 1.8 1.4 0.9 4.8
Madagascar 26 L 5.5 7.5 -0.2 -0.1 1.2
Malawi 18 M 4.6 17.8 5.3 0.1 -0.3
Maldives 64 H 6.1 0.6 3.0 1.3 1.7
Mali 25 M 68.3 24.9 0.9 0.8 1.6
Mongolia 39 L 20.0 21.7 -0.6 2.6 -3.9
Mozambique 43 L 40.9 38.0 -1.3 -0.2 1.5
Nepal 29 M 68.4 14.3 4.7 0.6 0.6
Nicaragua 73 M 24.2 70.7 2.6 0.9 1.2
Niger (the) 20 M 136.4 86.5 7.0 0.6 0.8
Nigeria 4 L 45.5 22.3 33.0 5.6 7.6
Republic of Moldova 79 L 13.3 3.6 2.2 0.6 1.2
Rwanda 14 M 3.4 0.7 5.6 2.4 5.0
Senegal 28 L 32.6 97.0 7.3 1.1 0.8
Sierra Leone 41 M 15.9 0.6 1.1 0.2 1.3
Solomon Islands 32 M 12.1 0.9 2.7 0.6 0.8
Sudan 35 D 104.2 65.3 -1.7 0.3 0.2
Togo 55 M 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.9
Uganda 18 L 31.6 9.2 4.1 0.4 1.3
United Republic of Tanzania 38 L 328.3 52.0 8.5 0.1 0.5
Vanuatu 21 L 9.2 26.3 -13.2 -4.3 -2.8
Yemen 24 H 37.7 97.2 -2.9 0.5 0.2
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This evidence suggests that in the latter countries GDP indexation does not only help to stabilize the debt 
ratio, but provides additional insurance. The reason is that GDP growth is unexpectedly low when the 
real exchange rate depreciates and thus when capital losses realize on foreign currency debt. In fact, if the 
risk premium is zero (as we assume), equation (14) shows that the optimal share of GDP-indexed loans 
is greater than one if GDP growth either displays a negative covariance with exchange-rate depreciation 
or a positive covariance with net exports. A closer look at the estimated covariances (not reported in the 
tables) clearly points to the relation between output growth and the exchange rate as the main reason for 
the additional insurance that GDP-indexed loans may offer. This evidence is consistent with economic 
theory. Productivity shocks may lead to higher economic growth and unexpected real appreciation 
because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Furthermore, sudden stops and capital outflows may lead to 
output contractions and large depreciations of the exchange rate. Our model captures such effects well 
and suggests that GDP-indexed loans can also provide some insurance against debt valuation effects in 
bad times. This evidence points to further benefits of indexation that have not yet been considered in the 
literature.
However, contrary to what is commonly held, GDP-indexed loans are not always the best insurance 
instrument. For one fourth of the countries in our sample, the optimal share of GDP-indexed loans is 
negative which simply means that multilateral loans should not be indexed to GDP. The reason for this 
result is the finding, in 8 out of 11 countries, of a significant negative covariance of net exports with GDP 
growth. As unexpectedly high growth may lead to a greater absorption of foreign goods, higher payments 
on indexed loans could worsen instead of dampening the accumulation of external debt. However, 
before concluding against GDP indexation, it has to be seen whether an increase in debt payments 
during expansions might induce a greater control of aggregate demand in these countries. Finally, and 
interestingly, the case for GDP-indexed loans appears to be unrelated to the risk of debt distress, since 
countries are equally distributed in all risk categories.
We find that the introduction of foreign currency loans indexed to the dollar value of exports is a valid 
alternative to GDP-indexation. Tables 3 and 4 show that export-indexed loans would help to stabilize 
the debt ratio in a large number of IDA countries. Indexing at least a fraction of the debt to the value of 
exports would provide valuable insurance to 34 IDA countries at both 5- and 10-year horizons. However, 
full indexation would be optimal only in 16 of these countries, since the others display an optimal share of 
export-indexed loans below one. The reason is that export-indexed loans provide a hedge against output 
fluctuations only to the extent that exports are correlated with GDP growth. Although this is generally the 
case, such a correlation is far from perfect, as shown by the estimated covariances (not reported here).
The results in tables 3 and 4 are consistent with a positive relation between export and GDP growth, 
either from productivity improvements, export diversification or, more simply, from foreign demand. 
Interestingly, we find that export indexation, when optimal, also provides a hedge against the valuation 
losses on foreign currency debt due to real exchange-rate depreciation. Though consistent with the effects 
of long run productivity improvements, this result more likely reflects the impact of terms-of-trade shocks 
on the value of exports and the real exchange rate. It suggests that export-indexed loans could provide a 
valuable alternative to commodity price indexation, especially to those countries that do not depend on 
a single commodity export.
There is however evidence for the 5-year scenario that 6 countries would not benefit from export-indexed 
loans and that this group enlarges to 8 in the 10-year scenario. In the latter case, there are other 8 countries 
for which indexation should cover less than half of their debts. Although in a few cases this result is 
explained by a positive covariance between export growth and the exchange rate depreciation,17 a low 
or negative share of indexed loans is mainly due to a significant negative covariance of the growth of 
export with the ratio of net exports to GDP. This evidence is somewhat surprising but a rationale can be 
17 The countries are Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, and Mozambique.
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found in a positive relation characterizing the dynamics of exports, GDP and demand for foreign goods. If 
anything, this evidence suggests that, as for GDP indexation, export-indexed loans do not offer a ‘one size 
fits all solution’ to the problem of stabilizing the debt ratio. Finally, it is worth noting that in 5 countries 
conventional loans are preferable to both GDP and export indexation.
The last innovation that we consider is the denomination of loans in the borrower’s currency coupled with 
an inflation link. This debt instrument provides full protection against real exchange-rate depreciation 
and appears to be useful in stabilizing the debt ratio in a large number of countries. As shown in the last 
columns of tables 3 and 4, 36 out of 40 countries would benefit from having at least a fraction of their 
debts denominated in local currency and indexed to inflation. The optimal share of such debt is equal or 
greater than 0.9 in 29 countries at the 5-year horizon and in 26 countries at the 10-year horizon. As noted 
earlier, the covariance between exchange-rate depreciation and GDP growth is negative. This implies an 
additional insurance role for domestic currency loans; they avoid the capital losses on conventional loans 
when this is most valuable, i.e. when output growth is lower than expected. Indeed, real exchange-rate 
depreciations due to productivity shocks and capital outflows are a major cause of debt vulnerability 
which calls for either indexing the debt to GDP or denominating it in local currency. On the other hand, 
domestic currency loans are not as good a hedge as conventional loans against shocks to net exports. We 
find that in about half of our sample the ratio of net exports to GDP is positively correlated to exchange-rate 
depreciation which explains why, in most cases, the optimal share of inflation-indexed loans denominated 
in domestic currency is close to one.
In countries where net exports are particularly sensitive to exchange rate depreciation, domestic currency 
loans provide no insurance benefits, since exposure to currency risk allows to hedge shocks to net exports. 
The optimal share of domestic currency debt is negative in five countries, either at the 5-year or 10-year 
horizon: Djibouti, Malawi, Mongolia, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Interestingly, conventional loans 
are the best debt instrument in the cases of Djibouti and Vanuatu where no indexation scheme appears 
to improve debt sustainability.
The results of our analysis provide strong evidence in favour of domestic currency loans indexed to 
inflation. Lending in the borrower’s currency helps to stabilize the debt ratio against unexpected movements 
in the real exchange rate which is the main cause of debt vulnerability. Such innovation also seems easier 
to implement because inflation indexation has been widely experimented and inflation is released with 
fewer lags and less revisions than either data on GDP or exports. On the other hand, because in low income 
countries the real exchange rate tends to appreciate in the long run, domestic currency denomination 
may increase the expected cost of debt service, a problem that we have sidestepped assuming a zero 
risk premium. This raises the issue of how MDBs can maintain the concessionality of their loans while 
lending in local currencies. The incentive for opportunistic devaluations created by domestic currency 
debt is also a concern that inflation indexation might not fully eliminate.
We also find supportive evidence for GDP-indexed or export-indexed loans, but though such instruments 
provide valuable insurance to the majority of IDA countries in our sample, they benefit a fewer number 
of countries than domestic currency loans. A main lesson from our analysis is that a ‘one size fits all 
solution’ does not exist to the problem of stabilizing the debt ratio. This result is unfortunate in that it 
poses a serious obstacle for a general approach to the management of IDA countries’ debt.
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VIII. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COST OF PROVIDING INSURANCE
Although multilateral lenders, by indexing their loans to the LICs’ ability to pay, may gain from a lower 
frequency of debt crises, providing such insurance is risky as the volatility of debt payments increase. 
To implement an indexation programme with little or no insurance premium, GDP, export or currency 
risk must be uncorrelated across LICs, so that a diversified portfolio of loans can limit the risk exposure 
of multilateral lenders.
In this section we study the risk-return characteristics of a portfolio of indexed loans to the same group 
of 40 IDA countries considered in the previous section, to assess the potential for risk diversification and 
thus the feasibility of an indexation programme.
First, we shall examine risk diversification by studying the risk characteristics of a MDBs’ portfolio of 
loans indexed to real GDP or to the value of exports, or denominated in domestic currency. Second, since 
the volatility measures proposed in the literature are derived from within-sample estimates of expected 
returns, we shall provide evidence on unexpected 10-year portfolio returns to evaluate the risk arising 
from prediction errors. Finally, we shall estimate the beta coefficients from a capital asset pricing model 
using the correlations of VAR forecast errors between the returns on indexed loans and the GDP of OECD 
countries.
A. Risk diversification: the volatility of a portfolio of indexed loans
We first analyse the volatility of the returns on a portfolio of indexed loans to IDA countries over the period 
2000–2010, where the country weights in the portfolio are equal to their fraction of multilateral debt at the 
end of 1999. We investigate whether this portfolio would be significantly less volatile than the individual 
countries’ loans, as it would be the case if GDP (or export or currency depreciation) were uncorrelated 
across countries; i.e. we examine whether risk could be reduced through portfolio diversification.
We follow a similar approach to that proposed by Hausmann and Rigobon (2003). First, for each country 
in our sample we measure the volatility of the return on an indexed-loan as the standard error of the 
following regression:
 1( ) ( )t t tln Y ln Yµ ε−= + +  (31)
where the variable tY  to which loan payments are indexed (or depend) is modelled as a random walk with 
drift. tY  is alternatively: (i) the real value of GDP in local currency; (ii) the dollar value of exports; and (iii) 
the real exchange rate (for a given United States price level); i.e. the dollar value of an inflation-indexed 
domestic-currency loan. There are two motivations for this approach. First, for most IDA countries in 
our sample, a random walk with drift is a good description of the stochastic processes followed by the 
three variables under consideration; this null hypothesis is rejected in formal ADF tests only in 5 out of 
120 cases of which 3 are for GDP, and 1 each for the value of exports and the real exchange rate.18 Second, 
the estimated drift µˆ , i.e. the mean growth rate over the sample period, has the natural interpretation of 
the ex-post baseline growth rate of either GDP, exports or the real exchange rate. Hence, if the baseline 
growth were correctly predicted at the time the loans were disbursed, the regression residuals, ˆ tε , 
would provide an estimate of the annual holding returns on GDP-indexed and export-indexed loans. 
This would also be the case for domestic currency loans (despite the absence of a contractually defined 
18 The results of ADF tests are available by the authors upon request.
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baseline real exchange rate) under the reasonable 
assumption that IDA countries would have to be 
compensated for the expected real appreciation 
of their exchange rates.
Then, we compute the volatility of the MDBs’ 
portfolio as follows. Consistently with our 
proposal for the indexation method, we construct 
the series of the annual return on such portfolio 
taking for each year, t , the weighted average 
of the residuals, ˆ itε , from the 40 country 
regressions. The weights of the portfolio are 
calculated as the outstanding multilateral debt of 
each country divided by the total multilateral debt 
of these countries in 1999. Finally, we compute 
the volatility of the portfolio return as the square 
root of the average of the squared elements of 
the resulting series, i.e. the statistical counterpart 
of the standard errors of the individual country 
regressions. Hence, we depart from Hausmann 
and Rigobon (2003) who use the portfolio weights 
to first compute the basket real exchange rate (the 
portfolio of IDA countries’ real exchange rates) 
and then the standard error of the real exchange-
rate depreciation of the basket currency. However, 
we also report this volatility measure to compare 
our results to those of Hausmann and Rigobon.
Our results are reported in figure 1, for GDP-
indexed, export-indexed, and domestic-currency 
inflation-indexed loans, from the top to the 
bottom panel. The continuous black line in 
figure 1 displays, in increasing order, the standard 
errors of the growth rates of GDP, exports and 
the real exchange rate obtained from the single-
country regressions, i.e. our measure of the 
annual return volatility of the indexed loans to the 
40 IDA countries. The average standard error in 
the sample is indicated by the horizontal dashed 
light line, while the horizontal continuous line 
reports the standard error of the annual return on 
the MDBs’ portfolio and the dashed dark line the 
corresponding Hausmann and Rigobon’s measure 
of the portfolio volatility.
The visual impression conveyed by figure 1 
is that there is a tremendous amount of risk 
diversification by lending to IDA countries 
whatever is the type of indexation. Indeed, the 
volatility of the MDBs’ portfolio is not only 
significantly lower than the sample average of 
the volatilities of the 40 IDA loans, but very few 
countries display a return volatility lower than 
Figure 1
RISK DIVERSIFICATION OPPORTUNITIES
0
30
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
GDP volatility and risk diversification
Countries
Average
Port-Err
Port-GDP
5
45
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Export volatility and risk diversification
0
48
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Real exchange rate volatility and risk diversification 
Countries
Average
Port-Err
Port-Exp
Countries
Average
Port-Err
Port-ExRate
30
the MDBs’ portfolio; just 5, 3 and 5 in the case 
of GDP-indexed, export-indexed and domestic-
currency loans, respectively.
The first row of table 5 shows that the average 
standard error of the return on a GDP-indexed 
loan (the standard error of GDP growth) is 3.8 per 
cent, with a maximum of 29.9 per cent and a 
minimum of 0.6 per cent, while the standard error 
of the annual return on the MDBs’ portfolio is 
only 1.1 per cent. Hence, the risk of an overall 
portfolio of GDP-indexed loans is less than one third of the average volatility of the individual loans. The 
opportunities for risk diversification are slightly smaller in the case of export-indexed loans. As reported 
in the second row, the annual return volatility on a portfolio of such loans is 8.5 per cent, about one half 
the average standard error of the growth rate of exports (15.4 per cent) with individual-country loans 
ranging from a minimum volatility of 6.0 to maximum of 44.8 per cent. The last row of table 5 considers 
the volatility of the dollar return on domestic currency loans indexed to inflation (the standard error of 
real exchange rate depreciations). While, the average standard error in the sample is 11.8 per cent, with 
a maximum of 45.9 per cent and a minimum of 2.5 per cent, the standard error of the annual return on 
the MDBs’ portfolio is only 5.5 per cent, less than one half of the sample average.19
All in all, it appears that the individual country risk of indexed lending can be easily diversified in the 
MDBs’ portfolio. The potential for risk diversification is strongest in the case of GDP-indexed loans. 
The degree of diversification appears substantial even for the portfolio of export-indexed loans that 
has the worst performance. However, this evidence is far from being conclusive because looking at the 
volatility of annual returns might not be informative to ascertain the return-risk of long maturity loans 
such as those extended by the IDA window of the World Bank. In fact, under the maintained hypothesis 
of random-walk processes, the cumulated return over the sample period (relative to baseline growth) 
would be estimated by the sum of the regression residuals, tˆε , which is equal to zero by construction. 
The reason is that this approach implicitly assumes that the baseline growth of the indexing variables is 
equal to the estimated drift, µˆ , that is, that the baseline growth is correctly predicted at the time the loans 
are disbursed. In the next section, we provide evidence on the variability of 10-year returns on indexed 
loans arising from prediction errors.
B. Unexpected 10-year return on indexed loans
If the long-run growth rate of GDP or exports or the depreciation of the real exchange rate were perfectly 
foreseen, indexed loans would still provide a hedge against cyclical or exchange-rate fluctuations but 
they would offer little protection against a permanent fall in LICs’ ability to pay. Similarly, the returns 
on indexed loans over a long horizon, relative to conventional loans, would also be close to zero as, say, 
GDP would approach its baseline level. It is then important to assess the effect of the prediction errors that 
are inevitably made in estimating the long-run growth rates of the variables to which loans are indexed 
and thus in setting their baseline growth rates.
In this section, we maintain the hypothesis that GDP, exports and the real exchange rates evolve as random 
walks with drift but assume that their expected growth rates in 1999, used to set the baseline rates in the 
19 Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) finds a standard deviation equal to 15.8 per cent for the sample average and of 2.9 per 
cent for the overall portfolio that suggests more risk diversification, a result possibly explained by their 1980–2000 
sample period. In fact,when we construct the portfolio using their method, the volatility of the portfolio decreases only 
slightly to 4.7 per cent.
Table 5
RISK DIVERSIFICATION –  
PORTFOLIO VOLATILITIES 
Portfolio 
volatility 
Individual loan volatility 
Sample 
average 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
GDP-indexed loans 1.1 3.8 0.6 29.9
Export-indexed loans 8.5 15.4 6.0 44.8
Domestic currency loans 5.5 11.8 2.5 45.9
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loan contracts, are equal to the mean of the two 
drifts separately estimated for the periods 1990–
1999 and 2000–2010. In other words, we assume 
that expectations are half based on historical 
values and half based on perfect foresight. Then, 
we compute the unexpected 10-year return on 
each individual country’s loan as the difference 
between the log of actual GDP (or export or the 
real exchange rate) in 2010 and the log of the 
baseline level of GDP in the same year, where 
the latter is obtained by cumulating the expected 
growth rate of GDP previously derived as the drift 
mean. Finally, we compute the 10-year returns 
on the three portfolios of GDP-indexed, export-
indexed and domestic currency loans by taking the 
weighted average of the returns on the individual 
countries’ loans with weights corresponding to the 
debt shares in 1999.
The 10-year returns (relative to conventional 
loans) are displayed in figure 2 for GDP-indexed, 
export-indexed, and domestic-currency inflation-
indexed loans, from the top to the bottom panel. 
The continuous black line displays, in increasing 
order, the returns on the individual loans to the 
40 IDA countries. The horizontal light line reports 
the 10-year return on the MDBs’ portfolio, while 
the horizontal dashed line indicates the sample 
average of the individual loan returns.
The return on the MDBs’ portfolio is lower 
than the average of the returns on the individual 
country loans and is positive for all three types 
of indexation considered. This reflects the 
improved performance of IDA countries over the 
last ten years relative to the previous decade; on 
average, GDP and exports grew faster and the real 
exchange rate appreciated at a faster rate.
More importantly, the cumulated returns on the 
MDBs’ portfolios of the three types of loans 
provide interesting evidence on the potential 
gains or losses that could result from loan 
indexation, while the returns on individual loans 
are suggestive of the insurance that countries 
could obtain. Table 6 shows, in the first row, 
that the 10-year return on the portfolio of GDP-
indexed loans is 7.1 per cent, while the returns on 
individual loans vary from a minimum of -17.4 per 
cent to a maximum of 76.9 per cent. The 10-year 
return on the portfolio of export-indexed loans, 
reported in the second row, is as high as 44.0 per 
cent while the range of individual loan returns 
Figure 2
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is sizeable; it goes from -45.9 per cent to an 
astonishing 308.1 per cent. The 10-year (dollar) 
return on the portfolio of inflation-indexed 
loans denominated in domestic currencies is 
1.3 per cent. Although the variation of returns on 
individual loans is huge, from -852.8 to 309.4 per 
cent, 34 countries stay within a narrower range 
from -14.7 to 69.4 per cent.
This evidence suggests that indexing loans to 
the value of exports would be extremely risky 
for multilateral lenders because predicting the 
growth rate of exports is an almost impossible 
task. By contrast, the strategies of indexing loans to GDP or lending in the borrower’s domestic currency 
appear more feasible. It is however clear that large unexpected real depreciations would wipe out the 
dollar value of domestic currency debt while large unexpected real appreciations would dramatically 
increase its burden relative to conventional debt. As a result, it is hard to think that domestic currency 
lending would not affect the monetary policy of the borrowing countries.
C. A capital asset pricing model of indexed loans
The capital asset pricing model is often used in the literature (see e.g. Borensztein and Mauro, 2004) as a 
starting point to evaluate how markets would price GDP-indexed bonds, in particular, how large would be 
the insurance premium that investors require to hold such bonds. The CAPM implies that such premium 
depends only on the systematic component of GDP risk that is captured by the conditional correlation 
of the bond return with the return on the market portfolio; i.e. on the beta coefficient. According to the 
CAPM the expected return on any asset must be equal to
 1 11 1 1 1
1
( )
[ ]
( )
t i t M t
t i t F t t M t F t
t M t
Cov R R
E R R E R R
Var R
, + , +
, + , + , + , +
, +
;
= + −  (32)
where F tR ,  is the risk-free rate, M tR ,  is the return on the market portfolio and where the ratio of the 
covariance of the asset return with the market return to the variance of the latter is the beta coefficient.
Although the multilateral loans received by LICs are not traded in a market, and multilateral lenders 
barely hold any other financial asset, the beta coefficients might convey information on whether the risk 
of indexed-loans can be diversified away. We must however decide what would be a meaningful ‘market-
portfolio return’ that could be used for this purpose. Since multilateral lenders, such as the IDA window 
of the World Bank, are mainly funded through the contributions provided by their wealthier member 
States, GDP growth of OECD countries is a reasonable candidate for the market-portfolio return. The 
higher the correlation of LICs’ GDP growth (or export growth or real exchange-rate appreciations) with 
GDP growth in OECD countries – i.e. the higher the beta coefficients – the greater the risk that loan 
repayments may fall at times when fiscal resources for MDBs’ funding are scarce.
Defining with tY  the variable to which loan payments are indexed, and abstracting from valuation effects 
(i.e. capital gains or losses) which arise, for example, if tY  is autocorrelated, the return on an indexed loan 
can be approximated by t tR y y
∗+ −  where R  is the fixed rate component of the return, ty  is the log 
of tY  and ty
∗  is the log of its baseline level. Then, denoting with tq  the log of GDP in OECD countries, 
the beta coefficient is equal to
Table 6
PORTFOLIO RETURNS OVER  
THE PERIOD 2000–2010  
Portfolio 
returns 
Individual loan volatility 
Sample 
average 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
GDP-indexed loans 7.1 10.7 -17.4 76.9
Export-indexed loans 44.0 57.9 -45.9 308.1
Domestic currency loans 1.3 7.2 -852.8 309.4
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where we have used the fact that 1ty
∗
+  and ty  are known at time t .
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) estimate the beta coefficients through simple regressions of individual 
countries’ GDP growth rates on OECD growth rates. We run the same regressions for IDA countries over 
the period 1990–2010 and obtained similar results: the beta coefficients are generally low, not significant 
and even negative for one fourth of our sample.20 The beta coefficients estimated by regressing the rate 
of real exchange appreciation on OECD growth gave similar results. This evidence points to a weak 
correlation of the returns on loans indexed to GDP or denominated in domestic currency with the fiscal 
resources of multilateral lenders and suggests that the individual country return-risk on such loans could 
be easily diversified away. By contrast, we found high and significant beta coefficients for the growth 
rate of exports; its correlation with OECD growth suggests that export indexation could be risky for 
multilateral lenders.
However, the use of univariate regressions to estimate conditional correlation coefficients – i.e. the beta 
coefficients – is correct only if growth rates at time 1t +  are uncorrelated with other variables in the 
information set at t , as it would be the case if GDP, exports and the exchange rate were pure random 
walks. A better approach to the estimation of beta coefficients is to use the variances and covariances of 
the residuals obtained from a VAR analysis. We do so using the variances and covariances of the forecast 
errors of the VAR model presented in section VII.21 This allows us to estimate the beta coefficients for 
indexed-loan returns over investment horizons longer than one year. This is particularly useful in our case, 
since multilateral loans have a long time to maturity. Table 7 reports the beta coefficients for the returns 
on: (i) GDP-indexed loans; (ii) export-indexed loans; and (iii) inflation-indexed loans denominated in 
domestic currency. They are computed as the covariances of the forecast errors of the log of GDP, exports 
and the real exchange rate with the log of GDP of OECD countries divided by the variance of the forecast 
error of the latter variable. While the focus is on the 5-year and 10-year horizons, beta coefficients for 
the 1-year horizon are also reported in columns 1–3 for a comparison with the results in the literature.
In the case of GDP-indexed loans, beta coefficients are generally low for all countries at all horizon 
considered.22 At the 1-year horizon the unweighted average of the coefficients is only 0.33 (the median is 
0.28) which is lower than the average correlation found by Borensztein and Mauro (2004) for a different 
sample of developing countries. More important, both the average and the median of the coefficients 
decrease as the time horizon extends to ten years. When we focus on 5-year and 10-year horizons, no 
more than 13 countries exhibit a GDP correlation with OECD economies greater than 0.5. These results 
clearly suggests that GDP growth and thus the payments on indexed loans are, on average, very weakly 
correlated with OECD growth and thus with the fiscal resources of multilateral lenders. The risk premium 
implied by the CAPM on GDP-indexed loans is easy to compute using equation (32).23 Taking the average 
growth rate of GDP in the OECD area over the sample period, 4.4 per cent, as the expected return on 
the market portfolio, and 0.75 per cent as the risk-free interest rate on conventional IDA loans, the risk 
premium for the median IDA country is as low as (4.4 − 0.75)*0.28, i.e. just one percentage point per 
year. And, if we consider a 10-year horizon, and thus a median beta coefficient of 0.18, the risk premium 
20 Results are available from the authors upon request.
21 The model was slightly modified to add an equation for the GDP of OECD economies that was treated as an exogenous 
variable in section VII.
22 With the exception of Vanuatu, beta coefficients range from -1.3 to 2.1.
23 We assume that baseline GDP growth equal expected GDP growth, so that the expected return on a GDP-indexed loan 
equals the sum of the risk free rate and the risk premium.
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Table 7
BETA COEFFICIENTS OF INDEXED DEBT 
1-year horizon 5-year horizon 10-year horizon 
GDP Export Dom-curr GDP Export Dom-cur GDP Export Dom-curr  
Angola 1.3 9.3 4.5 0.3 6.7 1.5 0.4 8.5 2.9
Bangladesh 0.2 1.1 -0.9 0.3 4.2 -0.2 0.3 4.0 -0.4
Benin 0.6 -3.7 -3.6 0.6 -5.4 -3.9 0.2 -2.8 -2.0
Burundi 1.0 -0.3 -2.1 0.1 2.9 -2.1 -0.4 -3.1 -4.7
Cambodia 0.9 0.4 0.2 1.5 2.2 -0.2 1.6 3.1 -0.7
Cameroon 0.4 6.6 2.9 0.3 2.6 -0.5 0.5 2.6 -0.8
Congo (the) -1.0 9.6 14.9 -1.2 5.3 6.9 -1.9 0.2 0.7
Côte d’Ivoire -1.2 -0.5 -2.5 -1.4 -1.3 1.6 0.5 -4.5 -2.7
Djibouti -0.5 -3.8 -0.3 0.1 -2.5 0.0 0.2 -1.7 0.3
Ethiopia -1.3 3.5 3.7 -0.9 2.2 -1.7 0.1 7.3 -1.4
Ghana 0.2 0.7 5.1 -0.2 0.0 -1.7 0.1 1.3 -2.6
Guinea 0.5 6.9 -3.2 0.5 2.5 -0.9 0.5 0.4 -0.9
Guyana 1.3 3.0 -0.1 0.5 1.2 1.1 0.0 0.4 3.1
Haiti -0.1 1.8 0.2 0.2 3.6 -1.6 0.2 2.8 -2.7
Honduras 0.6 2.6 -0.6 0.1 4.4 0.3 0.0 4.7 0.6
Kenya 0.3 -3.6 1.9 0.5 4.3 0.1 0.6 11.9 -1.8
Kyrgyzstan 0.2 4.9 1.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 0.3 1.0 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -3.5 -0.2 2.8 -1.4
Lesotho 0.4 1.9 -2.3 -0.6 4.1 -1.5 -0.3 6.1 -1.7
Madagascar 0.2 7.0 -6.4 2.1 4.4 -6.5 2.1 4.4 -3.9
Malawi -0.4 -5.7 -2.4 -1.6 -6.4 -1.4 -1.8 -6.4 -1.3
Maldives 0.3 -1.7 -1.8 0.7 0.3 -1.0 1.6 3.1 -0.9
Mali -0.3 -0.4 -3.2 1.2 2.8 0.0 1.5 3.2 -0.5
Mongolia 1.3 7.0 4.4 0.9 6.9 2.9 0.8 8.2 3.4
Mozambique 0.5 3.5 1.1 -0.3 3.6 1.1 -0.6 4.4 1.7
Nepal -0.2 2.3 -0.7 0.3 -0.7 0.0 0.2 -3.0 -0.8
Nicaragua 1.1 0.4 1.0 0.7 -0.9 -1.1 0.1 -3.5 -1.3
Niger (the) -0.2 -2.5 0.3 0.6 -2.0 -0.8 1.0 0.0 0.4
Nigeria 0.4 9.6 4.9 -0.4 6.1 4.0 -0.9 3.5 2.8
Republic of Moldova 0.9 -0.6 -2.6 1.2 2.7 -0.2 1.1 2.3 0.1
Rwanda 0.6 -4.3 -2.2 1.8 0.9 -1.2 -1.7 -12.7 -11.7
Senegal 0.6 5.5 5.5 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.3 -0.3 1.5
Sierra Leone -1.0 -8.6 0.6 -2.1 -2.9 1.2 -2.2 1.4 1.7
Solomon Islands 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.9 -0.4 1.8 9.7 -0.4
Sudan 0.3 19.5 7.7 -0.3 8.3 2.3 -0.1 5.7 -4.0
Togo 0.5 -1.6 -1.9 -0.8 0.4 -0.6 -1.5 2.7 1.0
Uganda -0.6 -3.4 -1.1 -0.4 -1.7 -0.4 0.1 1.4 1.6
United Rep. of Tanzania 0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.7 -0.6
Vanuatu 4.2 11.7 0.2 3.1 7.6 -3.4 3.5 8.6 -2.5
Yemen -0.5 6.9 2.3 0.0 6.0 4.7 0.6 2.9 2.1
Mean 0.3 2.2 0.7 0.2 1.9 -0.2 0.2 2.0 -0.7
Mean no outliers 0.3 1.9 0.4 0.2 1.9 -0.2 0.2 2.2 -0.5
Median 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.3 2.2 -0.3 0.2 2.6 -0.6
N.obs Beta > 0.5 15 23 17 13 25 11 13 26 12
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falls to 0.7 percentage points. Finally, as beta coefficients vary considerably across countries, so do their 
income growth rates, which suggests, once more, large opportunities for risk diversification.
Turning to export-indexed loans, we find that beta coefficients are positive and large with an unweighted 
average around 2 at all horizon considered. This finding cannot be attributed to a few outliers, since the 
beta coefficient for the median IDA country is above 1 at the shorter horizon and increases up to 2.6 at the 
longer horizon. Indeed, the number of countries with a coefficient greater than 0.5 is as high as 23 at the 
1-year horizon and reaches 26 at the 10-year horizon. Export growth appears, perhaps not surprisingly, 
to be fairly correlated with OECD growth and thus with the fiscal resources of multilateral lenders. This 
evidence suggests that export-indexed loans may expose multilateral lenders to the risk of lower reflows at 
times when their funding needs are highest because of the weak performance of OECD donors. Therefore, 
the risk-return characteristics of export-indexed loans make such instruments the least appealing from 
the perspective of minimizing the risk exposure of multilateral lenders.
A different conclusion is reached if we consider inflation-indexed loans denominated in the domestic 
currencies of IDA borrowers. Table 7 shows that, at the 1-year horizon, the unweighted average of the 
beta coefficients for the dollar return on such loans is 0.67 despite the high coefficients reported for the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, possibly due to imprecisely forecasted real exchange 
appreciations. In fact, the beta coefficient for the median IDA country is just 0.39, not much higher than 
in the case of GDP-indexed loans. Furthermore, at longer horizons, over which the risk exposure of 
multilateral lenders should be evaluated, the dollar return on domestic currency loans tends to be negatively 
correlated with OECD growth, as shown by the negative average and median beta coefficients. Since 
the real exchange rate of IDA countries tends to appreciate when OECD growth is lower than expected, 
the increase in the dollar value of domestic currency debt may stabilize donors’ resources. This is the 
case for 25 countries in our sample for which the risk premium implied by the CAPM is even negative. 
More generally, it appears that no premium would be needed on domestic-currency lending to match the 
expected return on conventional debt, a result which is consistent with the findings of Hausmann and 
Rigobon (2003).
The evidence provided in this section suggests that the individual country risk of indexed lending could 
be easily diversified in the MDBs’ portfolio. The potential for risk diversification is greater in the case of 
GDP-indexed loans and local currency loans while the performance of export-indexed loans is weaker. 
This conclusion holds true whether the volatility of MDBs’ portfolios is compared to the risk of individual 
countries’ loans (see section VIII.A) or the CAPM beta correlations with OECD growth are compared 
across countries. Summing up, there are ample opportunities for risk-sharing among IDA countries, 
making it feasible for MDBs to provide loans indexed to GDP or to inflation and denominated in local 
currencies. Such loans could be extended at current interest rates, since the insurance premium implied 
by CAPM estimation is low while the frequency of debt distress episodes would be reduced.
We also showed evidence of large unexpected 10-year portfolio returns arising from prediction errors 
of GDP, exports or real exchange rates (see section V.B). Although this finding strengthens our previous 
conclusions on the insurance benefits of indexed debt for IDA countries, it also suggests that the risk for 
multilateral lenders arising from prediction errors would be substantial and especially so in the case of 
loans indexed to the value of exports because their long run growth is hard to predict. While it appears that 
the risks arising from unexpected swings in exchange rates or in long-run GDP growth can be diversified, 
this result hinges on the assumption that GDP indexation or domestic currency lending would eventually 
leave the behaviour and the policies of LICs unaffected. We turn to this issue in the next section.
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IX. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDEXATION
A main argument against contingent debt is that, by linking payments to variables that are partly under 
the control of the debtor country, indexed loans give rise to adverse incentives and moral hazard. In the 
case of GDP indexation, a debtor government may behave opportunistically along three dimensions. First, 
GDP-indexed debt, by reducing the risk of distress and the probability of default, may favour irresponsible 
fiscal policies and delay fiscal adjustment. Second, it may lower the government’s incentive to adopt 
policies that promote growth. Finally, there is the risk of ‘misreporting’; a government might be tempted 
to manipulate GDP data in order to pay less on its debt.
In fact, opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard will always be a concern in implementing debt insurance 
strategies, since a trade-off between the benefits of insurance and the risk of moral hazard will naturally 
emerge in any such scheme. How serious is the problem is however hard to tell. While the literature 
is mixed, many contend that the relevance of moral hazard is exaggerated (see e.g. Griffith-Jones and 
Sharma, 2006; UN 2004, 2005). Indeed, it is unlikely that debtor governments would ever take deliberate 
actions to forestall growth because it is an important policy target for low income countries; for instance, 
it is crucial to attract foreign investments and other capital flows. More important, what needs to be asked 
is how effective conventional debt is in preventing opportunistic behaviour. The long history of debt 
defaults, debt restructuring and relief in low income countries does not bode well for the disciplinary 
effects of conventional fixed-rate debt. Furthermore, because of ‘debt overhang’, conventional debt 
does not rule out disincentive effects; a heavy debt burden may act as an implicit tax on future income 
and therefore reduce incentives for investment and policy reforms. By stabilizing the debt ratio against 
macroeconomic shocks, indexed debt can prevent debt distress and be more effective in dealing with 
repayment difficulties than debt relief.
The potential manipulation of GDP statistics is probably a stronger argument against the introduction 
of GDP-indexed loans. More generally, the low quality of national accounts, if not ‘misreporting’, is a 
serious concern in the case of low income countries despite the continuous improvement of measurement 
standards and the substantial effort put forth by international institutions (including the UN and the 
IMF) in checking for data consistency. Certainly, the reliability of national accounts would have to be 
improved and their verification strengthened which would imply additional costs for the implementation 
of an indexed lending strategy.
The delay in the release of GDP data and their revisions are other practical obstacles to the introduction of 
an indexation programme. However, the lag with which loan repayments reflect economic performance, due 
to a late release of GDP data, should be a minor problem in the case of long-term loans aimed at linking the 
debt to the borrower’s ability to pay, since cyclical fluctuations will be spread over a long horizon ahead 
(see section IV). On the other hand, the fact that GDP data are subject to sizeable revisions, with new 
releases accruing over long periods, would require a careful design of contractual terms and conditions, 
for instance, the specification of a ‘cut-off date’ for new releases to affect amortization payments.
In light of the technical difficulties of GDP indexation, one may wonder whether inflation-indexed lending 
in local currencies would not provide a simpler solution to protect IDA countries from macroeconomic 
shocks affecting their economies. This would be a valuable innovation since the real exchange rate is 
quite volatile and, as shown in section VII, it tends to depreciate in bad times, impacting strongly on the 
borrower’s capacity to pay. Indeed, domestic currency loans would reduce developing countries’ exposure 
to exchange rate depreciations which are a major cause of vulnerability and debt crises.
Unfortunately, domestic currency debt also raises incentive issues. As the government might be tempted to 
monetize a debt in local currency, its payments will have to be indexed to the price level. However, while 
indexed debt is supposed to discipline monetary policy by increasing the cost of inflation, indexation may 
not work for the following reasons. First, indexation cannot dissuade the government from monetizing 
the debt if this does not lead to higher inflation, as it could be the case in the presence of price controls. 
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Second, price indexation may not fully remove inflationary temptations since seigniorage revenues 
could still be collected on money demand and nominal wages. If this were the case, inflation-indexed 
debt would fail to protect foreign lenders from the devaluation effects of monetary expansions. In fact, 
purchasing power parity holds, if at all, only in the long run; while price inflation takes time to build up, 
the exchange rate moves fast and overshoots its long run level. As inflation translates less than one-for-
one into currency depreciation, it can be rational for multilateral lenders to denominate their loans in 
hard currencies in order to protect the real value of their investment from real exchange-rate depreciation. 
Summing up, while both GDP-indexed loans and inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currencies 
provide insurance benefits, they both raise incentive issues and moral hazard problems. Local currency 
denomination may lead to greater laxity in monetary policy whereas GDP indexation, and the low quality 
of GDP data, may favour misreporting. Evaluating the relative costs for multilateral lenders of the two 
debt instruments is difficult, but the benefits of contingent debt appear, in both cases, to exceed the costs.
The novelty of GDP indexation compared to inflation indexation appears instead a minor argument, 
especially considering that a reliable price index may not be easily available in the case of low income 
countries. It is also worth noting that the arguments often raised against the introduction of GDP-indexed 
bonds, that they are difficult to price, illiquid and a costly financial innovation, do not apply to multilateral 
loans because, by their nature, loans are non-marketable and thus do not require the creation of a new 
market for them to be traded. On the other hand, the non-marketability of loans introduces practical 
difficulties of a different kind that have so far not been appreciated in the literature, but are a more serious 
obstacle to the implementation of any programme of indexed lending.
As discussed in section IV, for GDP indexation to work, a baseline trend for GDP (or a long-run growth 
rate) must be specified in the debt contract, since amortization payments have to be indexed to deviations 
of realized GDP from its baseline trend. If this were not the case, indexed loans would be attractive only to 
countries with poor growth prospects. Although a baseline exchange rate does not need to be specified for 
lending in local currencies, such debt is not immune from the problem. This is because the real exchange 
rate of low income countries not only tends to appreciate in the long run through a Balassa-Samuelson 
effect, but the expected rate of appreciation also varies significantly across countries, as shown in section 
V. This implies that, for LICs to borrow at the same expected cost as that of conventional debt, either the 
amount of transferred resource or their concessionality would have to be adjusted to individual countries’ 
expected real appreciations, unless a baseline exchange rate is specified in the contract. Incidentally, it 
is worth noting that the correct specification of a baseline trend for GDP or the exchange rate is a minor 
problem in the case of marketable bonds because different specifications would be adjusted by changes 
in their issuing price according to the market expectations of the future values of the indexing variables.
In the case of non-marketable loans, the baseline trend has to be carefully specified in the contract and, 
more importantly, it must be agreed upon by the contracting parties; i.e. the borrowing country and the 
MDB. This clearly raises incentive issues and adverse selection problems. On the one hand, the borrower 
would have an obvious incentive to claim that its growth prospects are strong in order to set the highest 
possible baseline trend for GDP and thus reduce future debt payments. On the other hand, the MDB would 
want to ensure itself an expected level of reflows comparable to those on conventional loans. This conflict 
of interests may give rise to lengthy negotiations and an agreement could be difficult to reach.24 Things 
are even more complicated, if the borrower has private information about its future growth prospects. In 
this case, if the baseline GDP trend were set ‘too low’, the MDB would run the risk that only countries 
with weak growth potentials would self select for receiving indexed loans.
24 One may wonder why a similar problem does not arise under the current Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) 
arrangement, since IDA countries which receive only grants because their debt is deemed unsustainable, might want to claim 
a stronger growth potential in order to receive loans of a larger size than grants. However, if indexed loans were offered 
with a baseline GDP growth chosen out of a continuum of possible rates, the scope for disagreement would be greater.
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Finally, it is worth observing that negotiations about the baseline trend of GDP, or the borrower’s 
choice between indexed and conventional loans may reveal private information by the borrower about 
the growth prospects of its economy and thus on the effectiveness of aid. This opens up the possibility 
for multilateral lenders to offer a menu of different loan contracts as a way of screening the different 
types of borrowers.25 While such schemes deserve further analysis, this discussion already suggests that 
contingent debt contracts have to be carefully designed and more research is needed to better understand 
their effects before a programme of indexation or domestic currency lending could ever be introduced.
X. POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Multilateral loans either indexed to GDP, or exports or denominated in domestic currency can reduce 
LICs’ vulnerability to adverse shocks to GDP, the exchange rate and net exports that threaten their 
debt sustainability. By reducing the likelihood that debtor countries run into repayment difficulties and 
eventually file for debt relief, indexed debt may also benefit multilateral lenders. Of course, it can be 
argued that explicit debt relief provides a simpler alternative than contingent debt to cope with adverse 
economic events that impair the debtors’ ability to pay. However, providing explicit insurance against 
macroeconomic shocks can be a more effective policy to deal with repayment difficulties because it 
avoids delays in delivering assistance, and saves on the costs of debt renegotiation and conditionality 
associated with explicit debt relief.
In this paper, we have evaluated the benefits and costs of indexing MDBs’ loans to variables related to 
the LICs’ ability to pay, and thus whether a reform of multilateral lending is feasible and economically 
justified. The analysis covers 40 IDA countries over the period between 1990 and 2010, and focus on 
three types of debt: foreign currency loans indexed to real GDP; foreign currency loans indexed to the 
dollar value of exports; and inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currency.
Portfolio risk analysis shows that there are large opportunities for risk-sharing among IDA countries, 
confirming previous results in the literature. Individual country risk could be easily diversified in a 
portfolio of loans to IDA countries, as the volatility of the MDBs’ portfolio is much lower than the average 
volatility of individual loans for all types of indexation considered. However, the long-run growth rate of 
the value of exports appears more difficult to predict than the growth rates of GDP and the real exchange 
rate. These prediction errors result in large unexpected 10-year returns on a portfolio of export-indexed 
loans and thus in substantial risk for multilateral lenders.
The estimation of beta coefficients for individual country loans from a CAPM, where OECD growth is 
taken as the relevant market-portfolio return, suggests that the risk exposure of multilateral lenders in 
providing loans indexed to GDP or denominated in local currencies would be limited. Indeed, not only 
beta coefficients vary considerably across countries, but they are generally low in the case of GDP-
indexed loans and even negative, on average, for domestic currency loans. As the return on such loans 
is weakly correlated with OECD growth (and thus with the fiscal resources of multilateral lenders), their 
risk premium is no greater than one percentage point. By contrast, the risk of export-indexed loans is 
difficult to hedge because IDA countries’ exports are strongly correlated with OECD growth. Moreover, 
the number of IDA countries that could be covered by a programme of export indexation is limited by the 
availability of export data. These findings clearly favour GDP indexation and domestic currency lending 
over export indexation. Loans indexed to GDP or denominated in local currencies could be introduced 
at current interest rates because their risk premium is low while multilateral lenders would benefit from 
a lower risk of debt distress.
25 A similar point was made by Froot et al. (1989).
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We have also investigated the role of indexed loans in reducing IDA countries’ vulnerability to adverse 
shocks to output, exports and the real exchange rate, in a model where indexed debt helps to stabilize the 
debt ratio and thus reduce the likelihood of a debt crisis. The optimal type of indexation depends on the 
conditional variances and covariances of GDP growth, real exchange-rate depreciation and net exports 
(at long future horizons) that can be estimated as the covariances of the forecast errors obtained from a 
VAR model of each IDA country over the period between 1990 and 2010.
We find strong evidence in favour of local currency loans indexed to inflation and some support to GDP 
indexation. Lending in the borrower’s currency helps to stabilize the debt ratio against unanticipated 
movements in the real exchange rate that are a main cause of debt vulnerability. We also find supportive 
evidence for GDP-indexed loans, but while such instruments provide valuable insurance to a majority 
of IDA borrowers in our sample, they benefit a fewer number of countries than domestic currency loans. 
A main lesson from our analysis is that a ‘one size fits all solution’ does not exist to the problem of 
stabilizing the debt ratio. This result is unfortunate in that it poses an obstacle to a reform of multilateral 
lending that appeals to all IDA countries.
While both GDP-indexed loans and inflation-indexed loans denominated in local currency provide 
insurance benefits, they both raise incentive issues and heighten the risk of moral hazard. Local currency 
denomination may lead to greater laxity in monetary policy whereas GDP indexation may favour 
irresponsible fiscal policies and misreporting, also because of the low quality of GDP data. Evaluating 
the importance of these problems, and their relative cost for multilateral lenders, is difficult but the 
benefits of contingent debt appear, in both cases, to exceed the costs. If anything, the case for relying on 
the disciplinary effects of conventional debt is weak, as witnessed by the long history of debt defaults, 
debt restructuring and relief in low income countries.
Multilateral loans are immune from the pricing difficulties and liquidity problems that are major obstacles 
for the introduction of indexed bonds, but are sensitive to the contract design. The implementation of GDP-
indexed loans requires that the MDB and the borrowing country agree upon a country-specific baseline 
trend of GDP, since amortization payments must be indexed to deviations of realized GDP from its baseline 
trend for such loans to be attractive to countries with a high growth potential. This clearly raises incentive 
issues and adverse selection problems. In particular, we expect the borrowing country to strongly bargain 
over a ‘high’ baseline trend in order to obtain more favourable conditions. Although a baseline exchange 
rate does not need to be specified for lending in local currencies, the expected cost of debt service is likely 
to increase because in low income countries the real exchange rate tends to appreciate in the long run 
and at different rates in different countries. This implies that either the amount of transferred resources 
or their concessionality would have to be adjusted to individual countries’ expected real appreciations, 
for them to prefer local currency debt over conventional loans. Both in the case of GDP indexation and 
domestic currency lending a conflict of interests is likely to arise which makes an agreement difficult to 
reach. This poses a serious obstacle to any programme of indexed lending.
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